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Hate By Association:  
Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for Persecution 
 
Jacob A. Ramer* 
 
 
Far from being a vehicle for revenge, it is a tool for promoting reconciliation and restoring true peace.  If 
responsibility for the appalling crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia is not attributed to individuals, 
then whole ethnic and religious groups will be held accountable for these crimes and branded as criminal.  
In other words, "collective responsibility" – a primitive and archaic concept – will gain the upper hand; 
eventually whole groups will be held guilty of massacres, torture, rape, ethnic cleansing, the wanton 
destruction of cities and villages.  The history of the region clearly shows that clinging to feelings of 
"collective responsibility" easily degenerates into resentment, hatred and frustration and inevitably leads to 
further violence and new crimes.1
 
 
Introduction  
 
Perpetrating heinous acts against another solely on the basis of "otherness" has been a 
common theme throughout human history.  Whether it has been due to ethnic, racial, religious or 
political differences, certain governments and private actors have attempted to cleanse their 
territory of the "pollution" that appeared to threaten their ideology or existence.2  Oftentimes, 
purging campaigns resulted in mass death, such as during the Spanish Inquisition, which claimed 
tens of thousands of suspected non-believers.  Although the Holocaust was the most well-known, 
and certainly most well-organized, instance of persecution in the twentieth century, it does not lie 
in isolation.  During World I, the Turkish government killed approximately 1.5 million 
Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire.  Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge oversaw 
the deaths of up to three million people, a large portion because they were non-Cambodian or did 
                                                 
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006.  The author would like to thank Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. of 
Chicago-Kent College of Law for his insight and continued mentorship, as well as Dr. Avril McDonald for the 
opportunity to work with her on issues of international humanitarian law at T.M.C. Asser Institute in The Hague, 
The Netherlands. 
1 Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. 
GAOR/SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/342-S/1994/1007, ¶ 16 (Aug. 29, 1994). 
2 See generally BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., MORAL PURITY AND PERSECUTION IN HISTORY (2000).  
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not square with the communist regime's remaking of Cambodian society.  Many other notable 
examples easily come to mind.   
Persecution is frequently associated with death, but death, whether widespread or not, is 
not necessary for there to have been persecution.  Persecution may manifest itself through other 
violent means, or it may rear its head through the restraint of access to the necessities of life.  
The overarching belief, though, is that the "other" is always viewed by what it is not.3  Thus, the 
application is easy, regardless of location, language, belief system, or any other means of 
distinguishing oneself from another.  
For centuries, ruthless leaders and culpable underlings escaped retribution for their 
policies; if they did suffer consequences, it was only at the hands of a violent coup or a 
conquering people, usually resulting in their summary execution.  The regime of international 
criminal law seeks to reverse the long-standing cynical notion that "one murder makes a villain; 
millions a hero."4  But if anyone was ever to be held liable for policies that led to incalculable 
deaths, the most complex question, both in practical and theoretical terms, has been how to 
individualize responsibility when countless people participated.  Modern international law, as 
has always been the case in municipal law, now imposes individual—rather than collective—
criminal responsibility for actions deemed contrary to humanity.   
 This article considers the crime of persecution in international criminal law and how it 
has collided with the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise ("JCE") at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY").  The first section of this article briefly discusses 
the emergence of individual criminal responsibility in international criminal law.  The second 
section analyzes the doctrine of JCE, including its legal underpinnings in jurisprudence arising 
                                                 
3 Id. at 3. 
4 BEILBY PORTEUS, DEATH: A POETICAL ESSAY, Line 154 (1759).  Beilby Porteus (1731-1809) was the bishop of 
London and a staunch abolitionist.  
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from World War II, its modern formulation at the ICTY, and its similarities to conspiracy and 
accomplice liability in the U.S.  The doctrine of JCE liability attributes one's actions to another if 
both were part of a common criminal plan.  Through the third of three categories of JCE liability, 
an individual may be vicariously liable for another's acts if those acts are a foreseeable 
consequence of the joint enterprise.  The third section examines the origins and elements of the 
crime of persecution, which is a specific intent crime requiring the intent to discriminate on a 
given basis.  Because the crime's foundation stems from "crimes against humanity" and is now 
considered as a crime against humanity, the elements common to all crimes against humanity are 
also addressed.  Next, the fourth section considers "hate crimes" legislation in the U.S., and how 
their analytical framework can deepen understanding of the proper role between discrimination 
and vicarious liability.  The fifth section discusses the convergence of specific intent crimes, 
namely persecution and genocide, with the doctrine of JCE.  The final section proposes two 
improvements to the future use of JCE liability.  
 This article specifically argues that before liability attaches for participation in a JCE, the 
individual should have contributed significantly to that enterprise.  Minor participation in a 
common plan should not be enough to expand liability to far-reaching consequences.  The 
second modification would be that the third category of JCE should not be used for specific 
intent crimes.  Attributing the direct perpetrator's thoughts to the non-direct perpetrator, where 
that individual did not possess or intend such thoughts, is unjust and should be reconsidered.  It 
is no longer necessary to find a smoking gun or evidence of a direct order or participation; a 
muted form of guilt by association has effectively replaced such requirements.  
By incorporating these suggestions, modern international criminal law will refocus its 
energies on those most responsible for mass atrocities.  International law should not loosely 
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apply doctrines that dilute individual responsibility; doing so denigrates the importance of the 
very principles these institutions are meant to uphold.  Because of the relatively recent 
reemergence of individual criminal responsibility, and the political will around the world to 
enforce it, there is now a great opportunity to hone international criminal law into a regime that 
will never leave the world stage again. 
 
 
I. International Law and Individual Criminal Responsibility  
 
Under classical international law, only States held legal personality.  If a particular action 
was a crime under international law, the State alone was responsible; no international entity 
doled out punishments (or benefits) to individual persons.  This all changed in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II.5
 Prior to the Nuremberg Trial in 1945, individuals were charged under national law, 
usually military law, and tried before national courts.6  The Nuremberg Trial was the first clear 
enunciation of the notion that individuals have concrete duties under international law.7  In order 
to justify this new concept, the judges had to make a dramatic analytical leap from the 
international treaties they were citing, which mentioned nothing on individual duties, to the 
notion of individual criminal responsibility for "crimes" found within those treaties.8  In 
                                                 
5 See generally Kai Ambos, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law: A Jurisprudential 
Analysis – From Nuremberg to The Hague, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 5, Vol. I (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000). 
6 Andrew Clapham, Issues of complexity, complicity and complementarity: from the Nuremberg trials to the dawn of 
the International Criminal Court, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 31 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003). 
7 Id. at 30, 31.  
8 Id. at 32.  
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language familiar to the current politico-legal debate within the U.S. about the nature of a judge's 
role, one commentator has characterized what occurred at Nuremberg to be "judicial activism."9   
Attributing individual responsibility to military leaders was not an incredible legal 
stretch, though, because military courts had tried leaders for war crimes before.  For example, the 
Treaty of Versailles granted the Allies power to try individuals before their military courts "for 
violations of the laws and customs of war."10  Holding civilian leaders responsible, on the other 
hand, proved much more tenuous.  There was no precedent for trying civilians for international 
crimes prior to Nuremberg.11  The "Hang the Kaiser" moniker after World War I never came to 
fruition,12 mostly because the Netherlands granted asylum to him, and international pressure and 
interest eventually subsided in the proposition.  Despite its unsteady foundation, however, the 
concept has been widely accepted and subsequently used.  Individual criminal responsibility for 
certain acts, whether for military personnel or civilians, has arguably become customary 
international law.  
 Due largely to the Cold War, the leaders of wayward regimes and destructive 
paramilitary groups never faced retribution before an international tribunal.  If such individuals 
ever faced justice, it was usually in the way of summary executions.  States meted out 
punishment as they deemed fit for their own political purposes, oftentimes without proper trials.  
                                                 
9 Id.  Clapham quotes the Nuremberg Judgment, which stated: "The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, 
but in the customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from general 
principles of justice applied by jurists, and practised by military courts.  This law is not static, but by continual 
adaptation follows the needs of a changing world.  Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than express and 
define for more accurate reference the principles of law already existing." 
10 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, arts. 228(1), 229(1), (2), Consol. T.S. 225.  Germany was supposed to 
cooperate and hand over certain identified individuals under Articles 228(2) and 230, but it was uncooperative and 
few German nationals ever faced justice, either inside or outside Germany.   
11 Richard Overy, The Nuremberg trials: international law in the making, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: 
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 3 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003).   
12 Id. at 3.  The Treaty of Versailles stated in Article 227(1): "The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign 
William II of Hohenzollern, former German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties."  Under Article 227(2), an international tribunal was to be set up to try the Kaiser, but he fled 
Germany to The Netherlands where he was afforded refuge. 
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International law and its fundamental adherence to a strict version of sovereignty did not allow 
for interference.  Influence and internationally-recognized retribution stopped at the borders.  
This "live and let live" attitude finally changed when televisions across the world began to air 
shocking images from the Bosnian War and its sister conflicts of the early 1990's.   
 The international community, horrified by the sight of mass graves and stories of ethnic 
cleansing, launched an investigation to determine what crimes, if any, had been committed in the 
former Yugoslavia, and who had ordered or participated in such crimes.13  Tasked with the 
investigation, a five-member U.N. commission detailed specific violations of international 
humanitarian law, and perhaps more importantly, provided in its report the overall contextual 
framework for the conflict.14  In 1993, before the report was actually complete, the U.N. Security 
Council passed a resolution to create an international tribunal to prosecute those involved in the 
wars related to the breakup of Yugoslavia.15  The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia opened its doors in 1994 and received its first suspect one year later.  This modern 
incarnation of individual criminal responsibility before an international tribunal proved highly 
valuable to the movement of international criminal law.  The creation of the ICTY spurred a 
proliferation of tribunals.  In 1994, the Security Council established a tribunal to deal with the 
atrocities in Rwanda.  Internationalized national courts, which incorporate international criminal 
law and sit international judges alongside national judges, were also established with 
international backing.  These "hybrid" courts sprouted up in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East 
Timor to address the heinous crimes committed during conflict in their respective territories.  
                                                 
13 S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992).  U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 780 established a commission of experts to investigate "grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
other violations of international humanitarian law" committed in the former Yugoslavia.  
14 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994). 
15 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), 32 I.L.M. 1203 
(1993). 
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With memories of wide-scale humanitarian violations still fresh in their minds from the early and 
mid-1990's, the world came together in Rome in 1998 and finally settled on the creation of the 
first permanent institution to try persons accused of crimes such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.16  Four years later, in 2002, the Rome Statute had enough signatories 
to begin setting up the International Criminal Court.  
 
II. The Development of Joint Criminal Enterprise 
 
The concept of joint criminal enterprise has been called "the most complex and 
conceptually challenging theory in international criminal law."17  Its recent emergence (or re-
emergence for its staunch defenders) has provoked vigorous debate about its legitimacy.  The 
origins of the doctrine are generally attributed to events preceding and during World War II, but 
despite this early arrival, the ensuing fifty years contributed little, if anything, to the concept, 
until the ad hoc tribunals of the 1990's.   
Human rights groups herald the imposition of this doctrine and argue that it is grounded 
in customary international law.18  Several international criminal tribunals employ it today.19  
                                                 
16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 
2002). 
17 Allison Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, 
and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 103 (2005).  Danner and Martinez also 
note that the Appeals Chamber's judgment in Tadic referred to this concept by a variety of names and used them 
interchangeably: "common criminal plan," "common criminal purpose," "common design or purpose," "common 
criminal design," "common purpose," "common design," "common concerted design," "criminal enterprise," 
"common enterprise," and "joint criminal enterprise" (citing Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Form of 
Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 24, Case No. IT-99-
36/1 (June 26, 2001)).  
18 See, e.g., Bogdan Ivanisevic, 'Crime of Opinion' is One Thing, But War Crime is Another, Human Rights Watch 
Commentary (Feb. 11, 2005), at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/11/serbia10173.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). 
19 For example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone originally indicted Charles Taylor for his participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise that had as its purpose "to take any actions necessary to gain and exercise political power and 
control over the territory of Sierra Leone," which included the murder, abduction, forced labor, physical and sexual 
violence, the use of child soldiers, and the destruction of civilian structures.  Notably, the indictment alleged that 
these acts were either within the joint criminal enterprise or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint 
criminal enterprise.  Prosecutor against Charles Ghankay Taylor, Indictment, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Case No. SCSL-03-I (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSC-03-01-I-001.html (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2007).  The amended indictment dropped the phrase "joint criminal enterprise" and instead referred 
7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 37   
Nowhere does the Statute of the ICTY explicitly provide for the doctrine, yet since its 
"introduction" by the Tadic Appeals Chamber decision in 1999, it "has become the magic bullet 
of the Office of the Prosecutor."20  The doctrine had immediate effect at the ICTY, as the 
Prosecutor amended earlier indictments to include such liability, most notably in the Milosevic 
case.21  JCE liability appears to have now supplanted others as the favored theory of liability at 
the ICTY.22  The concept has been referred to by many names, but the ICTY has settled on "joint 
criminal enterprise" as the preferred term.23  The following section discusses the doctrine and its 
precursors at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well as the doctrine's comparison to 
vicarious liability in the U.S. 
 
A. The Nuremberg Tribunal  
 
Faced with trying leaders far removed from the battlefields and concentration camps, the 
founders and judges of the Nuremberg Tribunal considered several distinct doctrines that are 
central to understanding the foundations of vicarious liability in modern international criminal 
law.  First, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal provided for liability based on 
                                                                                                                                                             
to a "common plan, design or purpose."  Prosecutor against Charles Ghankay Taylor, Amended Indictment, The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL-03-I (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-01-I-75.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). 
20 William A. Schabas, The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the Major Rulings of the International Criminal 
Tribunal Over the Past Decade: Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 1032 (2003).  See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter, ICTY 
Statute]. 
21 Shane Darcy, An Effective Measure of Bringing Justice?: The Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 20 AM. INT'L L. REV. 153, 168-69 (2004) (noting that 
the first two indictments of Prosecutor v. Milosevic did not include such language, but the second amended 
indictment did include an allegation of participation in a joint criminal enterprise and that each individual was 
individually liable for transpired acts; the August 2001indictment alleged his participation in a joint criminal 
enterprise with Bosnian Serb military and civilian leaders). 
22 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Second Amended Indictment, ICTY, Case No. IT-03-66-PT, (Feb. 12, 2004).  
The original indictment and first amended indictment did not allege or refer to a joint criminal enterprise. 
23 See Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to 
Amend, supra note 17, ¶ 24; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging 
Jurisdiction—Joint Criminal Enterprise, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 36, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72 (May 21, 2003). 
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membership, and second, the Charter incorporated aspects of conspiracy law.24  A third doctrine, 
common plan or common design liability, which was used by national military authorities in 
proceedings following the Nuremberg Tribunal, later contributed to the development of imputed 
responsibility.25  This third doctrine is examined in the discussion relating to the ICTY. 
 Liability based on membership in a criminal organization can be attributed to Lieutenant 
Colonel Murray C. Bernays, a lawyer in the U.S. War Department's three-man "Special Project 
Branch," which had been given in September 1944 the job of developing a postwar justice 
system for Europe.26  At that time, the notion of justice imposed through a formal legal process 
was far from a foregone conclusion.  Throughout the war Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchill favored summary executions for those involved in the war, and they continually tried 
to persuade the other Allies to go along with the plan.27  Interestingly, the Soviet Union was the 
earliest advocate of a postwar tribunal, largely based on its own experiences with show trials.28  
But despite his early stance and the most vocal camp in his administration arguing for summary 
executions, Roosevelt ultimately sided with those in favor of an international tribunal.  
With the debate ongoing, Bernays doggedly approached the assignment.  Perhaps the two 
most difficult issues he had to address were how to punish prewar crimes against German 
citizens (including German Jews) and non-Germans, and how to deal with the millions of 
Germans who were members of the Nazi party, Gestapo, SS, and other organizations deemed 
                                                 
24 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal, arts. 6, 9-10, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, entered into force Aug. 8, 1945.  
25 Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 110-120.  Danner and Martinez separate World War II-era jurisprudence 
into three categories: "common plan liability" or "common design liability," conspiracy, and criminal organizational 
liability. 
26 HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 46 (1999). 
27 RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 8-9 (1971).  Great Britain was even 
calling for summary executions as late as April 1945.  In a letter sent to FDR on April 23, 1945, a British aide wrote, 
"[His Majesty's Government is] deeply impressed with the dangers and difficulties of this course [judicial 
proceedings], and they think that execution without trial is the preferable course.  [A trial] would be exceedingly 
long and elaborate, [many of the Nazis' deeds] are not war crimes in the ordinary sense, nor is it at all clear that they 
can properly be described as crimes under international law." 
28 BALL, supra note 26, at 45. 
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critical to the machinery of death and destruction.29  The first issue raised new legal concerns 
because war crimes, by traditional definition, could only occur during a time of war and could 
only be perpetrated upon another States' citizenry.  The world had just witnessed large-scale 
carnage, but they had been directed by a State against its own people, and they had occurred 
before the outset of war—realms of behavior outside traditional humanitarian law at the time.  
This is discussed in further detail below in section three relating to crimes against humanity.  For 
the second issue, Bernays looked to Anglo-American conspiracy law, noting precedents such as 
the Smith Act of 1938 in the U.S. and the British India Act of 1836.30  Bernays drew up his 
proposal within a few weeks, commonly referred to as "Bernays' Plan," and Roosevelt submitted 
it to Churchill and Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945.31  
Under Bernays' Plan, organizations would be charged and tried at the Nuremberg 
Tribunal alongside the two dozen individual defendants.  The judges would determine whether 
the organizations engaged in criminal behavior and should be designated as a criminal 
organization.  Once an organization was deemed criminal, subsequent military trials would be 
held for individual defendants where they would have to defend against their membership in the 
organization.  Judges would only have to determine whether the accused joined the organization 
voluntarily, and defendants would be unable to assert their ignorance as to the organization's 
criminal purpose.  The plan was meant to facilitate convictions and deal with an extremely large 
number of people involved in criminal activity.32  
                                                 
29 Id. at 46. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 48.  The British disapproved of the plan and still sought summary executions.  Churchill had even called for 
summary executions as late as April 1945. 
32 Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 113 (citing Stanislaw Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal Organizations, in 
THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 213, 216 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990)). 
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With Bernays' Plan on the table, the Allies met in 1945 in London to discuss postwar 
justice.  The concept of conspiracy figured prominently at the conference and provoked heated 
debates about the substantive and procedural law to be applied to those on the losing side of the 
war.  American lawyers sought the inclusion of conspiracy as a means of attaching liability to 
individuals where the relationship between them and the crimes was tenuous at best.  Because 
their underlings carried out the orders, most civilian leaders did not have "direct" involvement in 
the commission of atrocities.  The Americans took the lead in establishing the strike zones that 
the Tribunal would later use.  Some delegations apparently first picked their targets, and next 
worked out the legal principles that would snare the greatest number of high ranking and 
prominent alleged criminals.33  Conspiratorial liability allowed them to cast a wide net.  
On the other side of the table, the French and Soviet delegations distrusted conspiracy 
law and expressed strong criticisms about its use.  According to one account of the conspiracy 
debates at the London Conference:  
[T]he Russians and French seemed unable to grasp all the implications of the concept; when they finally 
did grasp it, they were genuinely shocked.  The French viewed it entirely as a barbarous legal mechanism 
unworthy of modern law, while the Soviets seemed to have shaken their head in wonderment--a reaction, 
some cynics may believe, prompted by envy.34   
 
But despite French and Soviet reservations, they eventually conceded and the Allies incorporated 
conspiracy law into the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major 
War Criminals of the European Theater, setting forth the authority of an international tribunal to 
prosecute those most responsible for the horrific crimes committed in Europe.35   
                                                 
33 See MINEAR, supra note 27, at 37.  One chief British representative at the London Conference stated: "What is in 
my mind is getting a man like Ribbentrop or Ley.  It would be a great pity if we failed to get Ribbentrop or Ley or 
Streicher.  Now I want words that will leave no doubt that men who have originated the plan or taken part in the 
early stages of the plan are going to be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."  
34 Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 115 (citing Pomorski, supra note 32, at 216-17 (citation omitted)).  
35 Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter provides: "Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in 
the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible 
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan."  Professor Cherif Bassiouni notes that "[o]n its 
face, such a formulation derives from the common law and does not have much in common with the Romanist-
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At Nuremberg conspiracy law played a role both as a substantive crime (conspiracy to 
commit crimes against peace) and as a means of liability, in that one could be convicted of 
others' acts that were within the execution of a common plan or conspiracy.36  The first count 
against the individual defendants, as well as the seven organizations, expressly reflected the 
concept of conspiracy as a substantive crime, which was titled "Count One – The Common Plan 
or Conspiracy."37  The indictment alleged, in summation, that all were guilty of:  
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy to commit 
Crimes against Humanity in the course of preparation for war and in the course of prosecution of war; and 
of a conspiracy to commit War Crimes not only against the armed forces of their enemies but also against 
non-belligerent civilian populations…38   
 
Following the language of the Charter, the indictment further alleged that the defendants had 
"participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution" 
of the common plan or conspiracy, and that they were each responsible "for their own acts and 
for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy."39  During the 
judgment deliberations, the British and Soviet judges accepted the validity of conspiracy as a 
sound legal doctrine along the lines of those set forth by the American prosecutors.   
French judge Donnedieu de Vabres disagreed and argued the case against the use of 
conspiracy law.40  He, along with his French alternate, wanted all of Count One thrown out.41  
They believed that the substantive crime absorbed the conspiracy, rendering the charge 
unnecessary.42  An American judge, Francis Biddle, even sympathized with the French because 
                                                                                                                                                             
Civilist-Germanic systems."  CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
382 (1999). 
36 Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 116. 
37 Counts 2, 3, and 4 were, respectively, "Crimes Against Peace," "War Crimes," and "Crimes Against Humanity." 
38 International Military Tribunal, Indictment, Oct. 6, 1945, reprinted in THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL: 
1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 64 (Michael R. Marrus ed., 1997). 
39 Id., reprinted in THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL: 1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 58 (Michael R. 
Marrus ed., 1997). 
40 THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL: 1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 231 (Michael R. Marrus ed., 1997).  
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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of his own experiences with overly broad conspiracy charges in the U.S.43  But Biddle's 
reservations were quite different than those of the French.  Where the French disagreed with the 
concept in general, Biddle disagreed with its potentially abusive application, in that too many 
Germans might be collared if the organizations were found guilty of conspiracy.44  The judges 
ultimately compromised and determined that the conspiracy charge was limited to the conspiracy 
to plan and wage aggressive war, but they dropped the charges of conspiracy in Count One 
relating to the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.45  The Tribunal ruled that 
Article 6 of the Charter did not define, and therefore could not support, the crimes of conspiracy 
to commit war crimes and conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity, unlike the crime of 
conspiracy to commit crimes against peace that was expressly provided for in Article 6(a).46  The 
Tribunal subsequently concluded that the common planning to prepare and wage aggressive war 
had been established. 
 Although not as significant as the prosecution would have liked, conspiracy as a means of 
attributing liability also played a role in the proceedings at Nuremberg.  At the time, co-
conspirator liability was well-known in common law jurisdictions, but no civil law country had 
embraced the doctrine.47  Apart from of the doctrine's level of acceptance around the world, it 
has been argued that co-conspirator liability was effectively discounted at the Tribunal, as 
evidenced by the fact that those convicted of conspiracy to commit aggressive war were either 
those who had directly participated in the planning or those who were among Hitler's most senior 
                                                 
43 Id. at 231-32. 
44 Id. at 232. 
45 Id. 
46 Article 6 listed three crimes: (a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; and (c) crimes against humanity.  Marrus 
notes that the charge of "crimes against peace" was the central concept and is critical to understanding the 
framework of the indictment; it was the conspiracy to commit crimes against peace that ultimately led to the other 
crimes—i.e., crimes against humanity and war crimes.  Because of the overlapping nature of the crimes, the 
prosecution had a difficult time separating the first two counts.  Id. at 122. 
47 Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 115, (citing Edward M. Wise, RICO and Its Analogues: Some Comparative 
Considerations, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 303, 312 (2000)). 
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leadership.48  It has also been pointed out that the judgment did not mention conspiracy (or 
common plan liability) in its discussion of those found guilty of crimes against humanity or war 
crimes.49  This finding is significant because JCE liability, as discussed below, is solely a vehicle 
for imputing liability; it is not a substantive crime in itself. 
 Regarding criminal organizational liability, under Articles 9 and 10 of the Charter,50 the 
prosecution charged seven organizations with being "criminal organizations": Nazi Party 
leadership; Reich cabinet; Nazi government ministers; SS; Gestapo; SD; Sturmabteilung (SA); 
storm troopers; and the military high command, which comprised Germany's army, navy and air 
force commanders-in-chief.  The Tribunal ruled that three findings must be established before 
holding an organization to be criminal: first, a majority of the organization's members must have 
been volunteers; second, the organization's public activities must have included one of the crimes 
falling within Article 6 of the Charter; and third, a majority of the members must have been 
knowledgeable or conscious of the organization's criminal activities or purpose.51  Using this 
framework, four of the groups (Nazi Party leadership, Gestapo, SS, SD) were found to be 
criminal.   
The next step in Bernays' Plan--the adjudication of individuals--never materialized.  The 
judges at Nuremberg tweaked Bernays' Plan and shifted the burden, in that the prosecution had 
to prove that the accused not only joined voluntarily but also had knowledge of the organization's 
                                                 
48 Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 116. 
49 Id. at 116-17. 
50 Article 9 of the Charter provided that "the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the 
individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal 
organization."  Article 10 of the Charter provided: "In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by 
the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for 
membership therein before national, military or occupation courts.  In any such case the criminal nature of the group 
or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned."  In order to be found guilty, the individual must 
have joined voluntarily, must have joined intentionally, and must have known that the organization was criminal. 
51 BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 385. 
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criminal purpose.52  This burden-shifting resulted in the lack of widespread summary trials for 
membership in criminal organizations.  The mass justice envisioned by Bernays was largely 
replaced with an administration de-Nazification program.53
The link between prosecuting organizations at Nuremberg and conspiracy law is found in 
Chief of Counsel Robert H. Jackson's opening statement on the criminality of organizations, 
when he stated that "proceedings against organizations are closely akin to the conspiracy 
charge."54  To illustrate the legitimacy of the process Jackson discussed conspiracy liability laws 
on the books in several countries.55  He broadly concluded that "[o]rganizations with criminal 
ends are everywhere regarded as in the nature of criminal conspiracies and their criminality is 
judged by the application of conspiracy principles."56  Jackson noted, however, that organization 
liability, although grounded heavily in conspiracy law, was not the exclusive product of national 
conspiracy law.  Looking to the language of the Charter, Jackson argued that it did not refer 
solely to "conspiracy,"57 thus hedging his bets if conspiracy law fell out of favor with the judges.   
The judges considered the similarities between a conspiracy and a criminal organization 
in that for the latter to exist, "there must be a group bound together and organized for a common 
                                                 
52 Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 114 (citations omitted). 
53 Id. 
54 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE LAW UNDER WHICH NAZI ORGANIZATIONS ARE ACCUSED OF BEING CRIMINAL, 
ARGUMENT BY ROBERT H. JACKSON, FEBRUARY 28, 1946, reprinted in, THE NURNBERG CASE: AS PRESENTED BY 
ROBERT H. JACKSON, at 104 (1971).  But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 382-83 (arguing that Jackson fell victim 
to the confusion between conspiracy and membership in criminal organization liability, in that Article 6(a) of the 
Charter linked conspiracy to "crimes against peace," and that the Nuremberg Tribunal did not rely on Article 6(a) for 
"crimes against humanity"). 
55 JACKSON, supra note 54, at 106-07.  Jackson stated: "The German courts in dealing with criminal organizations 
proceeded on the theory that all members were held together by a common plan in which each one participated even 
though at various levels.  Moreover, the fundamental principles of responsibility of members, as stated by the 
German Supreme Court, are strikingly like the principles that govern the Anglo-American law of conspiracy." 
56 Id. at 107. 
57 Id. at 108.  Jackson recounted how he had urged the court: "The Charter did not define responsibility for the acts 
of others in terms of 'conspiracy' alone.  The crimes were defined in nontechnical but inclusive terms, and embraced 
formulating and executing a 'common plan' as well as participating in a 'conspiracy.'  It was feared that to do 
otherwise might import into the proceedings technical requirements and limitations which have grown up around the 
term 'conspiracy.'  There are some divergences between the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy and that of 
either Soviet, French, or German jurisprudence.  It was desired that concrete cases be guided by the broader 
considerations inherent in the nature of the social problem, rather than controlled by refinements of any local law." 
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purpose.  The group must be formed or used in connection with the commission of crimes 
denounced by the Charter."58  The apparent linkage between conspiracy law and membership 
liability, however, did nothing to assuage later critics of the latter form of liability.  Renowned 
international criminal law professor M. Cherif Bassiouni argues that the notion of group or 
collective responsibility had no basis in international law at that time, thus violating the principle 
of legality.59  Even though reservations abounded in Nuremberg and there have been strong 
criticisms since, however, the means of vicarious liability used at Nuremberg did add greatly to 
the development of individual criminal responsibility in international law.  
 
B. The Tokyo Tribunal 
Often overlooked due to Nuremberg's long shadow, the Tokyo Tribunal also contributed 
to the development of international criminal law.  Set up to try Japanese war criminals for 
alleged crimes committed from the early 1930's to 1945, the Tokyo Tribunal lasted two and a 
half years, including the seven months taken by the judges in reaching a verdict, and resulted in a 
49,000-page transcript and 1,218-page judgment.60  The indictment charged twenty-eight 
individuals--nine civilians and nineteen professionals.  In contrast, of the twenty-two defendants 
at Nuremberg, seventeen were civilians.61  Along with the several dozen counts of crimes against 
peace, there were counts of murder, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.62  The core of the 
case revolved around the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, in contravention to several 
international agreements.   
                                                 
58 BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 390 (citation omitted).  
59 Id. at 384. 
60 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589.  See generally 
ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS 
(1987).  In contrast to the Tokyo judgment, the judgment at Nuremberg was 270 pages.  
61 BRACKMAN, supra note 60, at 83. 
62 Id. at 84. 
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As in Nuremberg, conspiracy law played a central role in the proceedings in Tokyo.  In 
his opening statement, Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan, a former U.S. Attorney that had 
written the Lindberg kidnapping law and led the gang-busting division at the Department of 
Justice, wanted to define conspiracy in terms of U.S. practice.63  He defended his proposal by 
stating, "This offense is known to and well recognized by most civilized nations, and the gist of 
it is so similar in all countries that the definition of it by a Federal court of the United States may 
well be accepted as an adequate expression of the common conception of this offense."64  One 
American supporter even argued that the proposed application was "modest" in comparison to 
Soviet and Anglo-Saxon law, and that it was more in accordance with French, German, Chinese, 
and Japanese notions of conspiracy law.65
The defense immediately attacked the conspiracy charge as dubious.  In its own opening 
statement, the defense argued that conspiracy had no longstanding tradition and was "unique in 
the Anglo-American legal system …[and] cannot be deemed to constitute international law."66  
Lead defense counsel Takayanagi Kenzo argued that it was "a peculiar product of English legal 
history," citing several Western legal scholars in support of his viewpoint.67  One of the 
commentators Kenzo cited had written that it was "a doctrine as anomalous and provincial as it is 
unhappy in its results.  It is unknown to the Roman law; it is not found in modern Continental 
codes; few Continental lawyers ever heard of it."68  After hearing arguments from both sides, 
                                                 
63 MINEAR, supra note 27, at 40.  The prosecution team was made up of eleven Allied nations, each nation 
contributing an assistant (not including the U.S.) to the team under the direction of Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. 
Keenan, an American. 
64 Id. at 41 (quoting TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS 8-9, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Publication 2613 (1946)).  The 
case Keenan is referring to is Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1937). 
65 BRACKMAN, supra note 60, at 85.  Brendan F. Brown, the dean of law at Catholic University, expressed this 
sentiment to the executive committee of the prosecution team.  
66 Id. at 284. 
67 MINEAR, supra note 27, at 41 (citation omitted). 
68 Id. 
7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 47   
however, the court ruled that conspiracy was indeed a crime under international law and 
continued the proceedings.69  
In language similar to the Nuremberg indictment, Count One of the Tokyo indictment 
alleged participation as "leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy …[to] wage wars of aggression, and war or wars in 
violation of international law."70  This count proved extremely successful, as all except two of 
the defendants were found guilty.71  Interestingly, two of the defendants found guilty of 
conspiracy to wage wars of aggression were found guilty of nothing else.72  With respect to the 
other counts in the indictment, the court threw out all but ten of the forty-five counts,73 and of 
those ten, only two did not relate to the waging of war.74  Thus, the waging of war, rather than 
other crimes, figured most prominently in Tokyo.   
                                                 
69 Judge Pal of India dissented and stated: "After giving my anxious thought to the question I have come to the 
conclusion that 'conspiracy' by itself is not yet a crime in international law."  President Webb of Australia agreed, 
who said that international law "does not expressly include a crime of naked conspiracy," and that the Tokyo 
Tribunal "has no authority to create a crime of naked conspiracy based on the Anglo-American concept."  Id. at 42. 
70 BRACKMAN, supra note 60, at 378.  Count One of the indictment read: "All the accused together with other 
persons, between the 1st January, 1928, and the 2nd September, 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, 
or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy, and are responsible for all acts 
performed by any person in execution of such plan."  The alleged object of this conspiracy was the domination of 
East Asia, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and all bordering countries. 
71 Id. at 374.  The judgment read:  "These far-reaching plans for waging wars of aggression, and the prolonged and 
intricate preparation for and waging of these wars of aggression were not the work of one man.  They were the work 
of many leaders acting in pursuance of a common plan for the achievement of a common object.  That common 
object, that they should secure Japan's domination by preparing and waging wars of aggression, was a criminal 
object.  Indeed, no more grave crime can be conceived of than a conspiracy to wage a war of aggression or the 
waging of a war of aggression, for the conspiracy threatens the security of the peoples of the world, and the waging 
disrupts it.  The probable result of such a conspiracy, and the inevitable result of its execution, is that death and 
suffering will be inflicted on countless human beings.  The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider whether 
there was a conspiracy to wage wars in violation of the treaties, agreements and assurances specified in the 
particulars annexed to Count 1.  The conspiracy to wage wars of aggression was already criminal in the highest 
degree.  The tribunal finds that the existence of the criminal conspiracy to wage wars of aggression … has been 
proved."  Id. at 414. 
72 MINEAR, supra note 27, at 42. 
73 BRACKMAN, supra note 60, at 379.  The dismissed counts were thrown out due to lack of jurisdiction, or because 
the count was redundant, had merged with another count, or was obscurely stated.  Id. at 373. 
74 Id. at 380.  Those two counts were 54 and 55.  Under Count 54, the Tribunal found five defendants guilty of 
having "ordered, authorized, and permitted" inhumane treatment of POWs and others.  Under Count 55, the court 
found seven defendants guilty of having "deliberately and recklessly disregarded their duty" to take appropriate and 
adequate steps to prevent atrocities from occurring. 
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The Tokyo Tribunal reinforced the concept of conspiracy within international criminal 
law but did little to clarify or modify the appropriateness of its use.  The judges felt somewhat 
constrained in their discretion, and they looked heavily towards the proceedings simultaneously 
underway in Nuremberg.  In one instance, when the prosecution began to present its case in 
relation to Japan's preparations for war in the Pacific and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the opening 
statement referred to a document from 1934.  One of the judges interrupted and stated:  
We have just received [the Nuremberg judgment], and the court there stresses the point that evidence of a 
conspiracy should not go too far back; it should be comparatively recent. … When you consider the 
Nuremberg judgment you may decide to cut down some of the material you intend to put before the 
court.75   
 
Clearly, decisions made at Nuremberg affected the substance and procedure administered in 
Tokyo. 
One historian of the Tokyo Tribunal stated that it actually suffered from the wake of Nazi 
atrocities and the Nuremberg Tribunal.  Richard H. Minear, in a respected account of the trial, 
argued that the charges of conspiracy in Tokyo were the result of overzealous prosecutors 
blindingly applying the unique context of Nazi Germany to Imperial Japan.  He stated that Tojo 
was not Hitler, there was no Nazi Party, the Japanese constitution and government was fully 
functioning, the leaders did not usurp any power, and the context of the Pacific War was totally 
different from the European theater.76  Those differences may be notable, but in spite of whether 
it was prudent for the judges to apply conspiracy law to the Japanese context, they clearly found 
conspiracy law to be firmly grounded in international law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Id. at 226. 
76 MINEAR, supra note 27, at 127-134. 
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C. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
 
In 1998, the Trial Chamber in Delalic and Delic at the ICTY referred to a "common 
criminal purpose."77  The Trial Chamber did not elaborate on the concept, but the brief mention 
opened the floodgates to a doctrine the ICTY would later call "joint criminal enterprise."  Less 
than one year later, the Appeals Chamber in Tadic employed similar language and provided teeth 
to the doctrine.78
The first full-length trial at the ICTY ended with mixed results.  Supporters pointed to 
Dusko Tadic's conviction in 1997 as a victory for human rights and the enforcement of 
individual criminal responsibility within international law.  Not since Nuremberg and its 
immediate progeny had an individual been subject to an international criminal tribunal.  The 
Tribunal found Tadic guilty on several counts, but he was also acquitted on several others.  
Despite their disappointment, human rights and post-conflict justice advocates could point to the 
acquittals as legitimizing the tribunal; it could not simply be dismissed as a case of victors' 
justice.  Had the process been a mere show trial, Tadic would have been found guilty on all 
counts.  The Appeals Chamber later reversed some of the acquittals, and in the process generated 
a heated debate regarding the proper limits of individual criminal responsibility within 
international law. 
Dusko Tadic, like many other Yugoslavians before the breakup of the country, lived in a 
multi-ethnic community.  As the owner of a local café and former karate instructor, the ethnic 
                                                 
77 Prosecutor v. Delalic and Delic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 328, Case No. IT-96-21-T (Nov. 16, 1998) 
(holding that where there is a pre-existing plan to commit crimes "or where there otherwise is evidence that 
members of a group are acting with a common criminal purpose, all those who knowingly participate in, and directly 
and substantially contribute to, the realisation of this purpose may be held criminal responsible under Article 7(1) 
for the resulting criminal conduct").  See also Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶¶ 211-13, 
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998); Schabas, supra note 20, at 1031 (observing that the doctrine of joint 
criminal enterprise stems from the Delalic court's discussion of complicity). 
78 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter, Tadic, 
Appeals Judgment].  
7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 50   
Serb interacted with Muslims on a regular basis prior to the unrest of the early 1990's.  During 
the time when Milosevic and Belgrade began to incite ethnic nationalism among their Serbian 
population, Tadic rose to become a local party leader of the Serbian Democratic Society in the 
Prijedor municipality in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  As a member of the paramilitary forces, he 
helped Serbian and Bosnian Serb forces take over the region.  Tadic later facilitated the 
expulsion and "resettlement" of the entire non-Serb population in his area.  His intimate 
knowledge of the community allowed him to pick out Muslim leaders, as well as other prominent 
local leaders, deemed detrimental to Serbian policies.  Such individuals were severely mistreated 
after being identified.  During the conflict many civilians were beaten, robbed and killed, and 
many others were taken to the detention camps of Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje.  
The Trial Chamber convicted Tadic on several counts of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes and he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.  It was the Trial Chamber's 
acquittal on one charge, though, that eventually led to the development of JCE liability.  The 
prosecution charged Tadic with the murder of five Muslim men in the Bosnian village of Jaskici.  
The Trial Chamber had determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Tadic was in fact a member 
of an armed group that entered Jaskici, that the group searched the village for Muslim men, and 
that the five Muslim men who were found shot to death after the group left the village had all 
been alive when the group first entered the village.79  Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber noted that 
it "cannot, on the evidence before it, be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had 
any part in the killing of the five men."80  Notably, the Trial Chamber did, however, find that the 
                                                 
79 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 373, Case No. IT-95-1-A (May 7, 1997) [hereinafter, 
Tadic, Trial Judgment]. 
80 Id. 
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murders temporally occurred after Serbian forces entered the village and engaged in ethnic 
cleansing in a nearby village.81   
The prosecution appealed this point and the Appeals Chamber reversed, holding that "the 
only reasonable conclusion the Trial Chamber could have drawn is that the armed group to 
which [Tadic] belonged killed the five men."82  According to the Appeals Chamber's review of 
the Trial Chamber's findings, Tadic had, "with other armed men, participated in the removal of 
men, who had been separated from women and children, from the village of Sivici to the 
Keraterm camp, and also participated in the calling-out of residents, the separation of men from 
women and children, and the beating and taking away of men in the village of Jaskici" where 
"five men were killed."83  The Appeals Chamber reasoned that the Trial Chamber's findings of 
such evidence were sufficient to attach liability.  Direct evidence linking Tadic to the murders 
did not exist, yet the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber and found that Tadic had 
acted pursuant to a common criminal design and was liable under Article 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute.84  Specifically, Tadic intended to further the criminal purpose "to rid the Prijedor region 
of the non-Serb population, by committing inhuman acts against them," and he was aware that it 
was foreseeable, and knowingly took the risk, that the group would kill non-Serbs in effecting 
this criminal aim.85   This holding became the foundation for the modern doctrine of JCE. 
                                                 
81 Id.  
82 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 183. 
83 Id. ¶ 178. 
84 See ICTY Statute, supra note 20, at art. 7(1).  Article 7(1) provides: "A person who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 
2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime." 
85 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 232.  Specifically, the tribunal stated, Tadic "had the intention to further the criminal 
purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb population, by committing inhumane acts against them.  That non-
Serbs might be killed in the effecting of this common aim was, in the circumstances of the present case, foreseeable.  
The Appellant was aware that the actions of the group of which he was a member were likely to lead to such 
killings, but he nevertheless willingly took that risk." 
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In finding liability the Appeals Chamber discussed whether participation in a JCE even 
falls within the language of Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.86  The court first confirmed the 
doctrine's legitimacy and then noted that Article 7(1) covers not only direct physical perpetration 
of the crime, but also that "commission of one of the crimes envisaged in Articles 2, 3, 4, or 5 of 
the Statute might also occur though participation in the realisation of a common design or 
purpose."87  This position has been affirmed by the Appeals Chamber in later decisions.88  
Specifically, the court determined that participation in a JCE is a form of "commission" within 
the ambit of Article 7(1).  
Seeking to preempt the doctrine's critics, the Appeals Chamber stated that liability 
stemming from participation in a JCE is not tantamount to guilt by association.  A "guilt by 
association" charge would fuel critics and de-legitimize a principle it was embracing, and the 
court wished to attack those charges head-on.  The Appeals Chamber referred to the 1993 Report 
of the U.N. Secretary-General on Security Council Resolution 808, which had rejected outright 
the notion of guilt by association in stating that the Tribunal should not have jurisdiction over 
persons simply based on their membership in a particular organization.89  The court reaffirmed 
the principle of personal culpability, holding that "nobody may be held criminally responsible for 
acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated."90
                                                 
86 See supra note 84. 
87 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 188. 
88 See, e.g., Milutinovic et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction—Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, supra note 23, ¶ 20; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 73, Case No. IT-97-
25-A (Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter, Krnojelac, Appeals Judgment].  But see Steven Powles, Joint Criminal 
Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 606, 611 
(2004) (noting that it is difficult to understand how "committing" can include third-category JCE; he has no problem 
with first-category JCE and the "committing" language, because the individual intends the act, but he has a problem 
with third-category JCE falling within the ambit of the language of "committing"). 
89 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. 
S/25704, ¶ 56 (May 3, 1993). 
90 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 186. 
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 The Appeals Chamber then laid the general framework for JCE liability, which has been 
consistently followed ever since.  There are three categories of JCE, and each one must satisfy 
three requirements: 1) a plurality of persons; 2) the existence of a common plan, design or 
purpose that involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute; and 3) the 
participation of the accused in the common plan involving the perpetration of the crime provided 
for in the Statute.91  These three objective elements comprise the actus reus for all three 
categories.  The mens rea, in contrast, is different for each category.92
The first category of JCE involves the situation in which all the co-participants share the 
same criminal intent, e.g., where all the co-perpetrators formulate a plan to kill a particular 
individual.  Although only one member of the group may physically commit the act, the others 
are no less responsible for the killing as a result of their shared intent.  To be liable for others' 
acts the individual must have voluntarily participated in one aspect of the common design and 
must have intended the result.93  
 The second category is a variant of the first category, growing out of the so-called 
"concentration camp" cases.94  In these cases, the actus reus is "the active participation in the 
enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred from the position of authority and 
the specific functions held by each accused," and the mens rea comprises "(i) knowledge of the 
                                                 
91 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 698, Case No. IT-02-60-T (Jan. 17, 2005) 
(citing Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 227). 
92 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 228. 
93 Id. ¶ 196.  The Appeals Chamber stated: "for imputing criminal responsibility to a participant who did not, or 
cannot be proven to have, effected the killing are as follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one 
aspect of the common design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, or by providing material 
assistance to or facilitating the activities of his co-perpetrators); and (ii) the accused, even if not personally effecting 
the killing, must nevertheless intend this result." 
94 But see Powles, supra note 88, at 609-610 (arguing that the concentration camp cases are more akin to third-
category JCE rather than first-category JCE because if, for example, the guard participated in the oversight but did 
not know of particular acts but those acts were foreseeable, then the guard would still be liable, and this sounds like 
third-category JCE, not the first-category JCE where the guard would have intended the illegal acts). 
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nature of the system and (ii) the intent to further the common concerted design to ill-treat 
inmates."95
 The third category, sometimes referred to as the "extended" category, under which the 
Appeals Chamber convicted Tadic of the Jaskici murders, concerns cases involving "a common 
design to pursue one course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, 
while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the 
effecting of that common purpose."96  The now-classic example, as provided by the Appeals 
Chamber, is the shared intention by a group of individuals to remove forcibly an ethnic group 
from their village, which during the process a victim is shot and killed.97  In such a case, "[w]hile 
murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common design, it was 
nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint might well result in the 
deaths of one or more of those civilians."98  In other words, "[c]riminal responsibility may be 
imputed to all participants within the common enterprise where the risk of death occurring was 
both a predictable consequence of the execution of the common design and the accused was 
either reckless or indifferent."99  The Appeals Chamber supported this category with case law 
from World War II-era national military courts dealing with, inter alia, mob violence.  These 
cases are cited as evidence of what some refer to as common plan or common design liability.100  
The Appeals Chamber asserted that JCE liability is present in many national legal 
systems and is grounded in customary international law.  Several commentators avowedly 
                                                 
95 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 203. 
96 Id. ¶ 204. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Danner and Martinez, supra note 17, at 110. 
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disagree with that proposition,101 especially with respect to the third category.  Steven Powles 
argues that third-category JCE, upon closer inspection, is not uniformly practiced.102  Powles 
attacks the Appeals Chamber's use of the Essen Lynching103 and Borkum Island104 cases, stating 
that they do not stand for the propositions cited by the Tribunal in Tadic.  In the Essen Lynching 
case, a crowd of German civilians participated in the group-beating and killing of three British 
prisoners of war while they were under the escort of a German soldier.  Determining who dealt 
the final death blows to the victims was not practically feasible.  Before a British military court, 
the prosecution argued that if the attackers had the intent to kill the prisoners, then they were 
guilty of murder; if they had no such intent, then they could still be found guilty of 
manslaughter.105  Powles suggests that the murder convictions only illustrate the fact that the 
court found the attackers to have intended to kill the airmen, not, as the Appeals Chamber in 
Tadic suggests, that the defendants were found guilty based solely on the fact that they had 
knowledge that others' lethal acts were foreseeable yet continued their participation.106   
Powles similarly finds little support for third-category JCE in the Borkum Island case.107  
After being shot down in the German town of Borkum, seven American prisoners were forced to 
march through the streets while being subjected to mob violence by the local civilians.108  
German officials and soldiers facilitated and participated in beating and firing at the men, 
                                                 
101 See, e.g., id. (noting that the two types of cases cited are those involving unlawful killings of Allied POWs by 
German soldiers and by German townspeople, and those involving concentration camps). 
102 Powles, supra note 88, at 615-16.  For a commentator supporting the Tadic Appeals decision with respect to 
third-category JCE, see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 187 (2003) (stating that the court had 
demonstrated that third-category JCE "was based on case law, had a solid underpinning in many national legal 
systems, and in addition was consonant with the general principles on criminal responsibility laid down both in the 
ICTY Statute and in customary international law" (citing Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 224-229)). 
103 Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others (Essen Lynching Case), British Military Court for the Trial of War 
Criminals, in I LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 88, U.N. War Crimes Commission (1947). 
104 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 210-213 (discussing the Borkum Island case).  
105 See id. ¶ 208. 
106 Powles, supra note 88, at 616. 
107 Id. 
108 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 210. 
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resulting in their deaths.  The Appeals Chamber in Tadic considered the prosecution's opening 
statement in Borkum Island and determined that it had espoused a form of common design 
liability, namely, first-category JCE whereby each individual shared the same intent to commit 
the crime.109  The Appeals Chamber then took great liberty and "presumed" that because all of 
the accused had been found guilty pursuant to a criminal common design to assault the POWs, 
and because some of those accused had also been found guilty of murder, then "[p]resumably, 
this was on the basis that the accused, whether by virtue of their status, role or conduct, were in a 
position to have predicted that the assault would lead to the killing of the victims by some of 
those participating in the assault."110  Citing this case strained credulity and did little in the way 
of providing evidence that the expanded form of JCE has deep roots within international law.   
Powles does agree, however, with the Appeals Chamber's interpretation of the post-
World War II Italian case D'Ottavio et al.111 as support for the third category, but he notes that 
one case alone, out of several cited, does not warrant the finding that this form of vicarious 
liability is customary international law.112  D'Ottavio et al. involved the shooting of an escaped 
prisoner during the course of the crime of "illegal restraint," and because it was foreseeable that 
one of the participants might shoot and kill the prisoner as a result of their common criminal 
plan, all participants were found guilty of manslaughter.113  The Appeals Chamber cited several 
other Italian cases but none of them appear to conclusively support third-category JCE.114  
Professors Allison Danner and Jenny Martinez also argue that the World War II-era case 
precedent cited by the Appeals Chamber does not support the extended form of JCE.  Instead, 
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they argue that more similarities may be drawn from two concepts present at Nuremberg, neither 
of which was cited as support for third-category JCE: criminal organization prosecution and the 
crime of conspiracy.115  Both of these concepts are discussed above.  
 Other prominent commentators tend to pass over the legitimacy of third-category JCE--
the category that certainly requires the most justification.  For example, in his 2003 international 
law textbook, former justice and president of the ICTY Antonio Cassese devotes less than a page 
to criminal responsibility for non-agreed-upon yet foreseeable crimes of other participants in a 
criminal plan, whereas he spends almost seven pages justifying individual responsibility for non-
direct perpetrators that had intended the commission of the crime within a criminal plan.116  
Cassese reviews the cases mentioned by the Tadic Appeals Chamber concerning the first and 
second category of JCE but passes over the cases supposedly supporting the third category.  
 The mens rea sufficient for liability under third-category JCE also stretches notions of 
individual criminal responsibility.  With respect to the first category, the accused must have 
shared the intent to commit the crime actually committed.117  If the accused had the intent to 
commit the crime and participated in the commission of that crime, then culpability is easily 
justifiable.  With respect to second-category JCE, the accused must have had knowledge of the 
system of repression in which he participates, and must have intended to further that common 
design involving ill-treatment.118  Again, the accused must have had the specific intent to 
participate in specific criminal activity. 
 Third-category JCE differs greatly on the mens rea required to find liability.  Under the 
third category, the accused is responsible for crimes that go beyond the object of the JCE if he 
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was: 1) aware that those non-agreed-upon crimes were a foreseeable consequence of the JCE; 
and, 2) with that awareness, he willingly took the risk that that the additional crime may occur 
and continued his participation in the criminal enterprise.119  The Trial Chamber in Brdjanin and 
Talic120 explained that the first element as to whether the crime was a natural and foreseeable 
consequence is objective, whereas the second element as to the individual's awareness of that 
natural and foreseeable consequence is subjective.  That is, the accused need not have intended 
the co-actor to have committed any further crime, and he need not have possessed the other 
direct perpetrator's state of mind for that further crime in order to be found liable. 
 As seen from the Tribunal's expositions on the subject, the first and second categories 
require an intent to perpetrate the crime, whereas the third category merely requires knowledge 
that a certain crime is foreseeable, regardless of the mens rea of the accused concerning the 
actual foreseeable crime.121  Therefore, the first and second categories have a much stricter 
standard and are more difficult to prove, whereas a participant may be found liable under third-
category JCE under a much lower culpable state of mind.  In both situations, the non-direct 
perpetrator is liable.  If the prosecution wishes to prove liability under first-category JCE, it 
needs to establish the participant's specific intent to commit the agreed-upon criminal act that 
                                                 
119 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 613, Case No. IT-98-33-T (Aug. 2, 2001) [hereinafter, 
Krstic, Trial Judgment].  The Trial Chamber dichotomized the doctrine into those cases where the crime was within 
the purpose of the enterprise and those cases where the crime was outside the purpose but was nevertheless a 
foreseeable consequence of the enterprise.  The Trial Chamber stated, "if the crime charged fell within the object of 
the joint criminal enterprise, the prosecution must establish that the accused shared with the person who personally 
perpetrated the crime the state of mind required for that crime.  If the crime charged went beyond the object of the 
joint criminal enterprise, the prosecution needs to establish only that the accused was aware that the further crime 
was a possible consequence in the execution of that enterprise and that, with that awareness, he participated in the 
enterprise." 
120 Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, 
supra note 17, ¶ 31. 
121 See E. Katselli, The Notion of Individual Criminal Responsibility for Participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise 
in the New International Criminal Law with Respect to the Crime of Genocide and in View of the New Charges for 
Bosnia Against Slobodan Milosevic, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1028 (Kalliopi Koufa ed., 2003) 
(noting that the stricter requirement of proof in the first category of cases is not present in the latter category of 
foreseeable crimes). 
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was subsequently committed.  Proving intent is generally difficult, not considering the system 
employed.  Conversely, if the prosecution wishes to pursue liability under third-category JCE, it 
only needs to prove that the act committed was foreseeable based on the participant's intent to 
further the original criminal purpose (setting aside for a moment the "willingness" aspect of mens 
rea).  This leads to an objective standard—a much easier and evidence-friendly means of 
proving "intent."  Taking this distinction into consideration, it is surprising that the prosecution 
ever pursues a defendant under first-category JCE rather than the wildly more encompassing 
third-category JCE. 
Upon inspection, the requisite mens rea for third-category JCE seems awfully similar to a 
standard of negligence—a standard of guilt generally considered inappropriate for serious crimes 
carrying lengthy prison sentences.122  Objective criteria, such as foreseeability, are accepted in 
negligence-based crimes, but those crimes do not carry the stiffest criminal penalties.  Such 
crimes are "a form of anti-social behaviour judged by a different yardstick" than those committed 
with malice and premeditation.123  Professor William Schabas argues that JCE, and command 
responsibility for that matter, "establish an objective rather than a subjective standard for the 
assessment of mens rea [in that the] … Tribunal can remain uncertain about what the offender 
actually believed, intended and knew, as long as it is satisfied with how a reasonable person in 
the same circumstances would have judged the situation and reacted."124  Schabas is correct to a 
certain extent but he does not address the "willingness" aspect of third-category JCE espoused in 
later jurisprudence of the ICTY.  The crime must not only have been a natural and foreseeable 
                                                 
122 See Schabas, supra note 20, at 1033 (referring to such serious-crimes convictions based on "negligence-like 
standard of guilt"). 
123 Id.  Schabas further writes: "The use of objective criteria to measure knowledge and intent is well-accepted in 
criminal justice systems in the case of negligence based-offences …[but that] negligence-type offences are not 
treated as the most serious crimes, and they do not attract the most serious penalties."  
124 Id. 
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consequence—a strictly objective element—but the accused must also have known of the 
foreseeable consequence and nevertheless "willingly" taken the risk.125  Even with the inclusion 
of the "willingness" sub-element, however, the mental element still remains largely objective.  If 
the prosecution successfully argues that a crime is a foreseeable consequence of a stated common 
plan, then the accused's actual state of mind will be difficult to rebut.  In fact, even if the 
individual knew of the foreseeable crime and took steps to avoid such consequences, that 
individual would nevertheless be responsible for all acts committed within the scope of that 
common enterprise.  Thus, the apparent subjective inclusion into the requisite mental element 
does little to protect against improper findings of personal culpability.  
 
D. Joint Criminal Enterprise In Comparison to Vicarious Liability in the U.S. 
 JCE may sound familiar to lawyers trained in the U.S.  Even foreign lawyers will 
recognize some aspects of JCE liability because in certain municipal legal systems, one may be 
found liable for another person's criminal acts.  Two forms of vicarious liability in particular 
allow for such attribution.  Although often used synonymously, "conspiratorial liability" and 
"accomplice liability" are distinct doctrines and should be considered separately.  Examining 
them as such reveals that JCE liability has characteristics of both. 
 Throughout its history conspiracy law has met with skepticism.  Because of the great 
potential to cast a wide net, conspiracy law has been referred to as the "darling of the modern 
                                                 
125 See Prosecutor v. Babic, Sentencing Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 27, Case No. IT-03-72-A (July 18, 
2005) (accused is liable under third-category JCE if "so long as the secondary crimes were foreseeable and the 
Appellant willingly undertook the risk that they would be committed, he had the legally required 'intent' with respect 
to those crimes") (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 83, Case No. 98-
30/1-A (Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter, Kvocka, Appeals Judgment] ("the accused must also know that such a crime 
might be perpetrated by a member of the group, and willingly take the risk that the crime might occur by joining or 
continuing to participate in the enterprise").  
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prosecutor's nursery."126  Even U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson once stated that 
the "crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition"127 and described it as a 
"dragnet device capable of perversion into an instrument of injustice in the hands of a partisan or 
complacent judiciary."128  Yet Jackson concluded that it "has an established place in our system 
of law …[and there is] no constitutional authority for taking this weapon from the 
Government."129  Interestingly, these comments came only half a decade after leading the U.S. 
prosecution team in Nuremberg. 
 Conspiracy law involves two separate, but interrelated, key concepts: conspiracy as an 
inchoate offense and conspiracy as a complicity doctrine.130  Regarding the criminal offense, in 
U.S. state common law a conspiracy is "an agreement by two or more persons to commit a 
criminal act or series of criminal acts, or to accomplish a legal act by unlawful means."131  An 
accused may be guilty of a conspiracy itself; the commission of an underlying act is not required.  
Unlike conspiracy, a JCE, standing alone, is not a crime per se.  JCE is only a complicity 
doctrine.  
 Critics of conspiracy as a crime in itself decry its inchoate nature, and they argue that 
such a crime defies expectations of criminal justice.  The fact that an individual may be found 
guilty of conspiracy despite not having committed an act in perpetration of any crime is hard for 
                                                 
126 Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). 
127 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
128 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 561, 572 (1951).  Jackson also referred to conspiracy law as "awkward and 
inept." 
129 Id. at 577. 
130 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 423 (3rd ed. 2001).  See also Kathy Diener and Teisha C. 
Johnson, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463 (2005) (providing a brief overview of conspiracy 
law). 
131 DRESSLER, supra note 130, at 423.  Section 5.03(1) of the Model Penal Code defines "conspiracy" as: 
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting 
or facilitating its commission he: 
(a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct that 
constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or 
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt 
or solicitation to commit such crime. 
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many to accept.  Mere agreement by two or more persons to commit a crime, with no further 
positive act required, including the partial or full commission of the crime, is enough to find guilt 
of conspiracy in some jurisdictions.  Conspiracy law, therefore, primarily focuses on the mens 
rea rather than the physical perpetration of any underlying crime.132  Because of this emphasis, 
one commentator has commented on the risk that "persons will be punished for what they say 
rather than for what they do, or [simply] for associating with others who are found culpable."133
The ICTY Appeals Chamber addressed the relationship between conspiracy and JCE, 
stating that the latter requires not only a meeting of the minds but also positive action in 
furtherance of the common plan.134  To support this, the Tribunal quoted the U.N. War Crimes 
Commission, which stated, "the difference between a charge of conspiracy and one of acting in 
pursuant [sic] of a common design is that the first would claim that an agreement to commit 
offences had been made while the second would allege not only the making of an agreement but 
the performance of acts pursuant to it."135  The Appeals Chamber also distinguished JCE from 
liability arising from membership in an organization.136  Unlike the Nuremberg Charter, 
organizational liability did not fall within the Statute of the ICTY.137  
 Comparing JCE liability to the crime of conspiracy raises interesting similarities and 
distinctions.  A conspiracy, as in JCE liability, requires two or more persons.  Likewise, those 
persons must possess all required intents.  For example, if three persons intend to agree, but only 
two of them intend to commit the underlying offense, then that third person is not guilty of a 
                                                 
132 Justice Jackson stated that conspiracy "is always 'predominantly mental in composition' because it consists 
primarily of a meeting of minds and an intent."  Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 447-48 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote 
omitted). 
133 Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1973). 
134 Milutinovic et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction—Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
supra note 23, ¶ 23.  
135 Id. n.65 (citing XV LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 97-98, U.N. War Crimes Commission (1948)).  
136 Id. ¶ 25.  
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conspiracy even though the other two are guilty.  Also similar to JCE, an express agreement 
amongst the parties is not required for there to be a conspiracy.138  The agreement may be 
inferred and may arise extemporaneously. 
 Furthermore, common law conspiracy is a specific intent crime, as is the case with 
persecution and genocide.  Conspiracy requires from two or more persons: 1) the intent to agree; 
and, 2) the intent that the object of their agreement be completed.139  Unless at least two persons 
possess these two specific intents, no conspiracy exists.140  Conspiracy's specific-intent nature 
oftentimes results in a higher culpability for the crime of conspiracy as compared to the object of 
the conspiracy.  For example, if two individuals agree to burn a house and an occupant dies in 
the process, they may be found guilty of conspiracy to commit arson, the underlying crime of 
arson, and the crime of murder (based on reckless indifference to human life), but they are not 
guilty of conspiracy to commit murder unless that was an object of their agreement.141  Although 
U.S. state common law splits on the question of whether conspiracy liability (i.e., liability for the 
crime of conspiracy) requires a higher level of culpability for attendant circumstances above that 
of what is required for the substantive offense of the criminal purpose,142 the Model Penal Code 
favors a higher culpability requirement. 
As stated before, the Tribunal has held that there is no distinct crime of JCE, and 
therefore, conspiracy as a substantive stand-alone inchoate offense is not directly applicable to 
ICTY jurisprudence on JCE.  JCE is solely a means of attaching liability, and thus, it is 
                                                 
138 DRESSLER, supra note 130, at 427. 
139 Id. at 433. 
140 Under U.S. common law, the term "intent" encompasses two distinct mental states: "purpose" and "knowledge."  
That is, an individual "intends" to commit an act if: "(1) it is his desire (i.e., his conscious object) to cause the harm; 
or (2) he acts with knowledge that the social harm is virtually certain to occur as a result of his conduct."  Id. at 119. 
141 See id. at 438 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b)). 
142 Id. at 437. 
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conspiratorial liability (i.e., vicarious liability for the acts of a co-conspirator) that is most similar 
to JCE liability and most relevant for the purposes of this discussion.   
 Conspiratorial liability is best understood when examining it alongside the doctrine of 
accomplice liability.  Teasing out the distinctions is important to understanding when a defendant 
might be vicariously responsible for acts committed by others not intended by the defendant.  
Conspiratorial liability is potentially broader, and more encompassing, than accomplice 
liability.143  One commentator distinguishes the two in the following manner: "an agreement 
between two or more persons to participate in the commission of a crime is the key to a 
conspiracy and, therefore, to conspiratorial liability.  Actual assistance in the crime is not 
required.  Accomplice liability requires proof that an actor at least indirectly participated 
(assisted) in the crime; an agreement to do so is not needed."144  This distinction demonstrates 
that it is possible for one to be a conspirator without being an accomplice,145 and one can be 
liable as an accomplice without being a conspirator. 
In laying the foundation for JCE, the Appeals Chamber in Tadic referred to "the notion of 
common design as a form of accomplice liability."146  The Appeals Chamber refrained from 
further discussion, and it does not appear that the court considered the distinction between 
accomplice liability and conspiratorial liability.  Nevertheless, based on this distinction above, 
JCE appears to be a hybrid resembling both accomplice liability and conspiratorial liability.  
Similar to accomplice liability, JCE liability requires participation in a common plan involving a 
criminal offense.  Similar to conspiratorial liability, JCE liability requires the existence of a 
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145 See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946). 
146 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 220.  The Appeals Chamber stated that "the notion of common design as a form of 
accomplice liability is firmly established in customary international law and in addition is upheld, albeit impliedly, 
in the Statute of the International Tribunal." 
7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 65   
common plan—i.e., a meeting of the minds.  Thus, JCE appears to merge two theories of liability 
found within U.S. state common law. 
 Another example helps demonstrate this distinction.  Consider a Serb happening upon a 
group of Bosnian Serbs beating a Bosnian Muslim at night.  The Serb realizes what is 
transpiring, and, unbeknownst to the group, turns on the lights with the intention that the beating 
be more productive.  Under U.S. common law, even though he did not throw a punch, the Serb 
might be found guilty of battery under accomplice liability because he participated in and 
facilitated the criminal act.  He would not be guilty, however, under a conspiratorial liability 
theory because there was no meeting of the minds between his and the group's.  If the Serb had 
earlier met the group at a café, and indicated that he would turn on the lights at a specific 
moment to initiate the beating, but later reneged on this act, he would still be guilty of battery 
through conspiratorial liability because he had conspired to commit battery and his co-
conspirators carried out the plan.  He would also be guilty of conspiracy because actual positive 
assistance is not required.  Neither of these two examples, however, would result in JCE liability. 
The different legal phrases associated with these separate theories of liability further 
clarify the distinction.  Under an accomplice liability theory, an individual is generally liable for 
the "natural and probable consequences" of his intentional assistance in a given crime.  
Therefore, a natural and probable consequence of participation in an armed robbery would be the 
shooting and killing of a bank teller.  Even if the individual indicated to his partner-in-crime that 
he, under no circumstances, wanted anyone to die, he is still liable.  When considering 
conspiratorial liability, U.S. common law generally looks to whether the non-agreed-upon crime 
was a "reasonably foreseeable" act in furtherance of the conspiracy.  This rule of vicarious 
liability, espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, holds that a 
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conspirator may be held liable for the reasonably foreseeable acts of a co-conspirator committed 
in furtherance of the conspiracy.147  The critical component of this analysis is the starting point: 
how broadly does the prosecution define the conspiracy?  If the conspiracy is broadly defined, 
then many acts will be foreseeable consequences of the plan, but if the conspiracy is limited in 
scope, not much will be considered foreseeable as a result of the original conspiratorial plan.  
Several U.S. states and federal law follow Pinkerton liability, but several other jurisdictions and 
the Model Penal Code have rejected the approach.148
 
III. The Development of the Crime of Persecution 
A. The Foundation of Crimes Against Humanity  
 The phrase "crimes against humanity" is often credited to the Nuremberg Charter but 
permutations are found much earlier in the century.  Several international instruments that 
regulated armed conflict, most notably the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, had already 
prohibited certain acts that would comprise what were later known as crimes against 
humanity.149  For example, the Preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention addressed "the rule of 
the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized 
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience."150  The 1907 
                                                 
147 Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-47 (established the rule of vicarious liability in conspiracy cases).  See also United 
States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 338 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a conspirator is liable for all the reasonably 
foreseeable acts of a co-conspirator committed in furtherance of the conspiracy). 
148 Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 115-16 (citing SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 693 (7th ed. 2001)). 
149 BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 42; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 
Oct. 18, 1907 (entered into force, Jan. 26, 1910); Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land (Hague II), July 29, 1899 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900). 
150 The Preamble states: "Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting 
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants 
and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience."  This has generally been referred to as the Marten's Clause, named after Russian diplomat Fyodor 
Martens who drafted it.  Later in the century, similar language was used in Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
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Preamble, along with the similarly-worded 1899 Preamble, may be considered the legal basis for 
crimes against humanity.151
Less than a decade later, on May 28, 1915, France, Great Britain, and Russia declared 
that the Ottoman Empire had massacred the Armenian population in Turkey, constituting "crimes 
against civilization and humanity" for which the perpetrators should be held responsible.152  Had 
it not been for the U.S.' apprehension of what legal content, or lack thereof, comprised crimes 
against humanity, the Treaty of Versailles might have used such language.153
 The first positive formulation in international criminal law for crimes against humanity 
arose from the London Conference in the summer of 1945.154  As discussed above in section 
two, the Allies met in London to hash out issues of postwar justice.  They debated the 
components of international law rather than what constituted German municipal law, which is 
what was later considered for Control Council Law No. 10.155  On August 8, 1945, the Allies 
settled on the London Agreement, which provided the authority to set up the Nuremberg 
Tribunal.  Crimes against humanity, along with war crimes and crimes against peace, took center 
                                                                                                                                                             
Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Additional Protocol I), arts. 1 and 2, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; and in Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Additional Protocol II), Preamble, Jan. 23, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
151 BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 42. 
152 Id. at 62.  Nothing amounted to this declaration, but nevertheless, the rhetoric of crimes against humanity was 
being formulated. 
153 Id. at 63. 
154 Id. at 1.  See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 24, at art. 6(c).  
155 Id. at 8.  The four occupying postwar powers of Germany adopted Control Council Law No. 10 as a charter for 
conducting war crimes trials in their respective territories.  The purpose of the law, which was a hybrid of German 
national and international law, was to try war criminals that were not major enough to go before the Nuremberg 
Tribunal.  Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50-55 (1946).  
Article II 1(c) of Law No. 10 read: "Crimes against Humanity.  Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of 
the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated…" 
7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 68   
stage.  The judgment at the Tokyo Tribunal, on the other hand, gave little consideration to the 
issue of persecution, or crimes against humanity for that matter.156  
The Nuremberg Charter listed three crimes falling within the Tribunal's jurisdiction: 
"crimes against peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity."  The Allies, notably the 
American, British, and Soviet delegations, realized that many of the atrocious acts committed 
during the war fell outside the parameters of the contemporary law of armed conflict, including 
war crimes and crimes against peace, and thus, they agreed upon this third category of crimes.  
The framers included "crimes against humanity" in the Charter to avoid a gross injustice that 
would have resulted had they rigidly adhered to the classes of people protected under the 
classical law of armed conflict.  In other words, war crimes did not cover many of the victims of 
Nazi Germany's Final Solution, as well as others who were targeted, because most were German 
nationals or nationals of German allies.  Moreover, war crimes could only occur during a time of 
war.  Crimes against humanity attempted to close that legal loophole.  Article 6(c) of the Charter 
defined "crimes against humanity" as: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated."157   
The U.N. War Crimes Commission highlighted several novel phrases in the definition 
that made crimes against humanity particularly pertinent.158  First, the crimes could be 
                                                 
156 Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Persecution, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INT'L CRIMINAL LAW at 
249, Vol. I (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000). 
157 Article 6(c) served as the model for Article II(c) of the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (1945) and Article 
5(c) of the Tokyo Charter (1946).  See BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 1-3.  
158 HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 
192-194, United Nations War Crimes Commission (1948). 
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committed against "any civilian population," which necessarily includes a country's own citizens.  
No longer would nationality be a procedural bar.  Second, the crimes could be committed "before 
or during the war" as opposed to only being committed during war.  Third, crimes against 
humanity may occur "whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated."  The drafters were well-aware that many of the criminal acts committed by the 
Nazis were not "criminal" under German law due to discriminatory laws passed under Hitler's 
direction.  These principles ensured that no Nazi atrocity would be barred from prosecution. 
This arguably new category of crimes generated much discussion.  The drafters at the 
London Conference debated whether "crimes against humanity" could be supported under any of 
the sources cited by the Permanent Court of International Justice: international conventions, 
customary international law, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, or 
writings and legal decisions by distinguished jurists.159  After concluding in the affirmative, the 
attendees then were faced with the more difficult task of determining the contents of the 
crime.160  
Because of the crime's dubious and uncertain parameters, the drafters presumably were 
heavily concerned with the principle of legality.  Professor Bassiouni sheds light on the 
formulaic process, stating that the drafters had to "stitch together different elements of pre-
existing law and to extrapolate therefrom new legal elements while satisfying the requirements 
of the 'principles of legality.'"161  The drafters determined that crimes against humanity "are 
simply an extension of war crimes because the category of protected persons is the same in the 
                                                 
159 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 38, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 390. 
160 BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 9. 
161 Id. at 9, and generally Ch. 4.  Bassiouni asserts that although there is little record of discussions involving the 
principle of legality, this is probably because the drafters did not want to give evidence to the defense counsel and 
opponents of the Tribunal as to the dubious nature of "crimes against humanity" and that it violated the principles of 
legality, see page 31. 
7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 70   
two crimes, the difference being whether the violators were of the same or another 
nationality."162  Thus, crimes against humanity were originally grounded in international 
humanitarian law and should be understood as such.  Linking this new category of crimes with 
the already well-established category of war crimes would, perhaps, allay potential problems 
arising from the principle of legality.163   
But why was it not until 1945 before such crimes were covered under international law?  
New laws are often mere responses to events never imaginable or problems previously dormant.  
Bassiouni refers to the events from 1932-1945 as highly indicative of this principle, writing that 
it was a "case where the facts went beyond what international law had posited" because "the law 
seldom anticipates the unthinkable."164  Prewar international law definitely did not cover events 
such as the Holocaust, but the Nazis were far from being the first to perpetrate mass evil upon a 
specific population.  It was, however, the first time when several leading countries had the 
political will and existing network to cooperate in pushing international law in such a direction.  
 
B. Common Elements to Crimes Against Humanity 
Since the Nuremberg Tribunal, crimes against humanity have become entrenched as a 
legitimate and identifiable category of crimes.  No longer do lawyers and scholars debate the 
merits of the existence of such a category.  Over the past sixty years, however, the individual 
elements of these crimes proved elusive.  ICTY jurisprudence has changed this considerably.  
Article 5 of the Statute gives the Tribunal power to prosecute persons responsible for crimes 
against humanity, and since its first trial, the Tribunal has added greatly to the development of 
crimes against humanity.  Crimes against humanity now have a checklist of components, thus 
                                                 
162 Id. at 10. 
163 Id. at 17. 
164 Id. at 42. 
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ensuring uniformity in application.  Because of its tremendous influence on modern international 
criminal law (and because of its wholehearted acceptance and widespread use of the doctrine of 
JCE), the ICTY's decisions concerning crimes against humanity figures prominently in this 
article, and thus, all definitions and stated elements are garnered from the ICTY.  
 There are four elements common to all crimes against humanity.  First, there must be an 
armed conflict, either international or internal in character.165  Second, "the acts of an accused 
must be part of a widespread or systematic attack."166  Importantly, the attack need not be both 
widespread and systematic; either is sufficient.  "Widespread" is generally defined as "the large-
scale nature of the attack and the number of targeted persons," whereas "systematic" refers to 
"the organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random 
occurrence."167  It is the attack, not the individual criminal acts of the accused, that must be 
widespread or systematic.168  The acts of the accused need only be a part of the attack and a 
"single or limited number of acts" may constitute a crime against humanity "unless those acts 
may be said to be isolated or random."169  For example, "[p]atterns of crimes, in the sense of the 
non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis, are a common 
                                                 
165 See ICTY Statute, supra note 20, at art. 5.  Article 5 of the ICTY Statute provides: "The International Tribunal 
shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, 
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population." 
166 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 93, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A (Dec. 17, 
2004) (underline original) [hereinafter, Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment] (citing Prosecutor v. Blaskic, 
Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 98, Case No. IT-95-14-A (July 29, 2004) [hereinafter, Blaskic, Appeals 
Judgment]). 
167 Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 94 (citing Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 101, referring to Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 96, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (June 
12, 2002) [hereinafter, Kunarac, Appeals Judgment]). 
168 Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 94 (citing Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 101, referring to Kunarac, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 96). 
169 Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 94 (citing Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 101, referring to Kunarac, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 96); Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 135, Case No. IT-99-36-T 
(Sept. 1, 2004) [hereinafter, Brdjanin, Trial Judgment]. 
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expression of such systematic occurrence."170  An "attack is not limited to the use of armed 
force; it encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian population."171
 An important distinction is that between an "attack" and an "armed conflict."  According 
to the Trial Chamber in Brdjanin, the two concepts are: 
distinct and independent from each other.  The attack could precede, outlast or continue during the armed 
conflict, without necessarily being part of it.172  To establish whether there was an attack, it is not relevant 
that the other side also committed atrocities against its opponent's civilian population.173  Each attack 
against the other side's civilian population would be equally illegitimate and crimes committed as part of 
such attack could, all other conditions being met, amount to crimes against humanity.174   
  
The Trial Chamber further stated that the temporal and geographical relationship between the 
crime and the attack need not be necessarily tight.  The criminal acts "need to objectively 'form 
part' of the attack by their nature or consequences,175 as distinct from being committed in 
isolation, but they do not need to be committed in the midst of the attack."176  The Trial Chamber 
additionally noted that "a crime committed several months after, or several kilometres away from 
the main attack could still, if sufficiently connected otherwise, be part of that attack."177  Article 
5 of the Statute grants jurisdiction over crimes "committed in armed conflict," but the Trial 
Chamber in Brdjanin, citing favorably the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac, held this to be different 
than that required in Article 3 crimes (violations of the laws and customs of war), which requires 
                                                 
170 Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 666 (citing Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 94; Blaskic, Appeals 
Judgment, ¶ 101). 
171 Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 666 (citing Kunarac, Appeals Chamber, ¶ 86); Brdjanin, Trial 
Judgment, ¶ 131. 
172 Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, ¶ 131 (citing Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 251; Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 86; 
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 54, Case No. IT-97-25-T (Mar. 15, 2002) [hereinafter, 
Krnojelac, Trial Judgment]). 
173 Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, ¶ 131 (Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 
580, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Feb. 22, 2001) [hereinafter, Kunarac, Trial Judgment]; Kunarac, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 87). 
174 Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, ¶ 131 (citing Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 87). 
175 Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, ¶ 132 (citing Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 248; Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 85, 99-
101). 
176 Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, ¶ 132 (citing Kunarac, Trial Judgment, ¶ 417 et seq.). 
177 Id.  
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a "close relationship" between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict.178  Instead, "the 
nexus with the armed conflict under Article 5 is 'a purely jurisdictional prerequisite which is 
satisfied by proof that there was an armed conflict and that objectively the acts of the accused are 
linked geographically as well as temporally with the armed conflict.'"179   
Significantly, crimes against humanity do not require that the acts of the accused and the 
attack itself must have been committed pursuant to a pre-existing policy or plan.180  The 
existence of a plan or policy, however, may be relevant when proving the elements, namely, 
whether the attack was widespread or systematic, and whether the attack was directed against the 
civilian population.181  But these elements may be sufficiently proved through reference to other 
evidence without resorting to proving up a plan or policy.182  Other factors that may be 
considered in determining whether an attack is widespread or systematic include the 
consequences of the attack upon the targeted population; the number of victims from the attack; 
the nature of the acts within the attack; the participation, if any, of officials and authorities; and 
any identifiable patterns of crimes.183
 The third common element to all crimes against humanity is that the widespread or 
systematic attack must be "directed against a civilian population."184  When determining what 
constitutes a "civilian population," the court must look to the state of customary international law 
at the time of commission of the act.185  The Appeals Chamber in Kordic and Cerkez established 
that the definition of civilians and civilian populations used in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I 
                                                 
178 Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, ¶ 133 (citing Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 57-60, 83). 
179 Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, ¶ 133 (quoting Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 83). 
180 Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 98. 
181 Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 120; Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 98. 
182 Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 120 (quoting Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 98 (footnote omitted)). 
183 Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, ¶ 136 (citing Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 95). 
184 Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 93 (citing Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 98). 
185 Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 97 (citing Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 110). 
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reflects customary international law.186  The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic affirmed the Appeals 
Chamber's elaboration in Kunarac on the meaning of a "civilian population," stating that: 
the use of the word "population" does not mean that the entire population of the geographical entity in 
which the attack is taking place must have been subjected to that attack.  It is sufficient to show that enough 
individuals were targeted in the course of the attack, or that they were targeted in such a way as to satisfy 
the Chamber that the attack was in fact directed against a civilian "population", rather than against a limited 
and randomly selected number of individuals.187   
 
The phrase "directed against" is satisfied when the civilian population is "the primary object of 
the attack," which may be found after considering, inter alia, the means and method of the attack, 
the status and number of the victims, the discriminatory nature of the attack and the crimes 
committed in its course, and the resistance to the attackers and the extent to which they complied 
with the precautionary requirements of the laws of war.188  If the alleged crimes were committed 
in the course of an armed conflict, the court will look to the laws of war in order to assess the 
nature of the attack and the lawfulness of those acts.189   
The burden of proof as to whether a person falls within one of the protected civilian 
categories lies with the prosecution.190  The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic determined, after 
considering Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention191 and Article 50 of Additional 
Protocol I,192 that:  
members of the armed forces, and members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed 
forces, cannot claim civilian status.  Neither can members of organized resistance groups, provided that 
they are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, that they have a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance, that they carry arms openly, and that they conduct their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war.  However, the Appeals Chamber considers that the presence within a 
population of members of resistance groups, or former combatants, who have laid down their arms, does 
not alter its civilian characteristic.193   
                                                 
186 Id.  See Additional Protocol I, supra note 50, at art. 50. 
187 Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 105 (quoting Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 90 (footnote omitted)). 
188 Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 106 (quoting Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 91 (footnote omitted)). 
189 Id. 
190 Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 111. 
191 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered 
into force Oct. 21, 1950). 
192 Additional Protocol I, supra note 150, at art. 4(A).  
193 Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 113 (citing Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and stating that it 
reflects customary international law). 
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The language seems workable upon first glance but it leaves open the question as to what 
happens when the attack was directed towards individual combatants who are among the 
"civilian population."  Because the population is considered civilian in nature despite the 
presence of soldiers or members of a resistance group, does an attack on those individuals 
constitute a widespread or systematic attack on the "civilian population"? 
 The answer might be found in the Brdjanin Trial Judgment.  When discussing the victims 
of an attack, the Trial Chamber noted that the attack does not have to target the entire civilian 
population in that area, but it also must not have been directed against a "limited and randomly 
selected number of individuals."194  Therefore, this language suggests that a limited attack on a 
specifically targeted (i.e., non-random) small group of insurgents, for example, would not be 
considered an attack for purposes of this element.195   
The fourth common element is that the perpetrator must act with "knowledge that his acts 
formed part of the broader criminal attack."  This mental element may be further broken down 
into two distinct mental sub-elements: 1) knowledge that there is an attack on a civilian 
population; and 2) knowledge that his acts comprise part of that attack.  Regarding both sub-
elements, actual knowledge must be present; knowledge of the risk is not enough.  The Appeals 
Chamber in Blaskic stated, "The Trial Chamber, in stating that it 'suffices that he knowingly took 
the risk of participating in the implementation of the ideology, policy or plan,' did not correctly 
                                                 
194 Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, ¶ 134 (citing Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 90) ("It is also not necessary that the 
entire civilian population of the geographical entity in which the attack is taking place be targeted by the attack.  It 
must, however, be shown that the attack was not directed against a limited and randomly selected number of 
individuals."). 
195 See also Limaj et al., Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶¶ 191-228, Case No. IT-03-66-T (Nov. 30, 2005).  The 
Trial Chamber held that the targeting of suspected collaborators with Serbian authorities did not constitute an attack 
on the civilian population. 
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articulate the mens rea applicable to crimes against humanity."196  The Blaskic Appeals further 
explained: 
the motives of the accused for taking part in the attack are irrelevant and a crime against humanity may be 
committed for purely personal reasons.  Furthermore, the accused need not share the purpose or goal 
behind the attack.  It is also irrelevant whether the accused intended his acts to be directed against the 
targeted population or merely against his victim.  It is the attack, not the acts of the accused, which must be 
directed against the target population and the accused need only know that his acts are part thereof.  At 
most, evidence that he committed the acts for purely personal reasons could be indicative of a rebuttable 
assumption that he was not aware that his acts were part of that attack.197
 
Earlier decisions at the ICTY, such as the Trial Judgment in Kunarac, determined that that 
knowledge would be satisfied if the offender willingly took the risk that his acts comprised part 
of a larger criminal act, regardless of whether he had actual knowledge.  Later decisions 
disagreed, holding that the accused must have knowledge of the attack and knowledge that his 
act is part thereof.198  The offender does not, however, need to have intimate or even peripheral 
details of the attack. 
 In addition to the two mens rea sub-elements, there is a third mental intent that must 
exist—the intent to commit the underlying criminal act that constitutes the crime against 
humanity.199  No further intent is required.  Unlike the crime of persecution, crimes against 
humanity (as a whole) do not require discriminatory intent.200
 
 
                                                 
196 Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 126. 
197 Id. ¶ 124 (quoting Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 103 (footnotes omitted)). 
198 See, e.g., Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 126; Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 99, 103. 
199 Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 99 (citing Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 124, referring to Tadic, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 248; Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 99, 102) (stating that the mens rea for crimes against 
humanity is "satisfied when the accused has the requisite intent to commit the underlying offence(s) with which he is 
charged, and when he knows that there is an attack on the civilian population and also knows that his acts comprise 
part of that attack."). 
200 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 305.  Other international instruments support the proposition that crimes against 
humanity in general, excluding persecution, do not require a discriminatory intent.  Those instruments include the 
Tokyo Charter, Control Council No. 10 and its jurisprudence, and the Rome Statute.  Notably, the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda differs, in that discriminatory intent is explicitly required for all crimes 
against humanity.  See Swaak-Goldman, supra note 156, at 256-257. 
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C. Elements of Persecution as a Crime Against Humanity 
Since World War II, the concept of persecution has crept more and more into the lexicon 
of international law.  Several legal instruments have applied to various contexts the principle that 
one should not be targeted or discriminated against based solely on an inherent characteristic 
such as ethnicity or a set of beliefs such as religion or politics.201  But even though many post-
1945 international conventions and declarations denounce discriminatory practices that result in 
persecution, none of them, except for the 1973 Apartheid Convention, actually criminalizes 
violations.202  Within municipal law, Professor Bassiouni has noted that there is no crime by the 
name of "persecution" in any of the world's major legal systems.203  After considering the 
common beliefs and definitions of "persecution" used in pre-1945 dictionaries in those countries, 
however, his proposed definition is: 
"State action or policy" leading to the infliction upon an individual of harassment, torment, oppression, or 
discriminatory measures, designed to or likely to produce physical or mental suffering or economic harm, 
because of the victim's beliefs, views, or membership in a given identifiable group (religious, social, ethnic, 
linguistic etc.), or simply because the perpetrator sought to single out a given category of victims for 
reasons peculiar to the perpetrator.204
 
In its first full trial on the merits, the ICTY considered this definition in determining the elements 
of persecution and the contexts in which it should be considered.205
The crime of persecution is among the crimes against humanity enumerated in Article 5 
of the ICTY Statute, along with murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, 
                                                 
201 See generally Swaak-Goldman, supra note 156, at 247-261. 
202 BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 328 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII) (Nov. 20, 1963); International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII) (Nov. 30, 
1973); Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 2263 (XXII), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2263 (Nov. 7, 1967); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (Nov. 25, 1981)). 
203 Id. at 327.  
204 Id. 
205 Tadic, Trial Judgment, ¶ 695. 
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torture, rape, and "other inhumane acts."206  Because persecution, like many other offenses in 
international criminal law, has not a long history of positive formulations and was largely 
without case law precedent, the Tribunal first needed to provide the elemental framework.  After 
its initial elucidations, over the years the Tribunal has continually reexamined the substance of 
the crime.207  This has resulted in numerous permutations on the exact elements and definition of 
persecution.  
Despite the unclear, and sometimes conflicting, jurisprudence on persecution, the 
Tribunal now prefers and commonly uses the formulation espoused by the Appeals Chamber in 
Kordic and Cerkez.  It defined persecution that constitutes a crime against humanity as:  
 an act or omission which: 
1. discriminates in fact and which denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international 
customary or treaty law (the actus reus); and  
2. was carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds, specifically 
race, religion or politics (the mens rea).208  
 
This definition clearly demonstrates that there are two distinct elements to persecutions.  Another 
definition that has been used on several occasions is the "the gross or blatant denial, on 
discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty 
law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5."209  Although the 
                                                 
206 Article 6 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda mirrors the language of Article 7 of the 
Statute of the ICTY, and thus, provides for the same crimes enumerated as crimes against humanity.  See Statute of 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994). 
207 For an examination of early jurisprudence on persecution at the ICTY, see generally, Ken Roberts, The Law of 
Persecution Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 623-639 
(2002); William J. Fenrick, The Crime Against Humanity of Persecution in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY, in 
NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAW 81-96 (2001).  
208 Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 101 (quoting Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 131, referring to Tadic, 
Appeal, ¶ 248; Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 99, 103).  See also Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, ¶ 431; Prosecutor v. 
Vasiljevic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 244, Case No. IT-98-32-T (Nov. 29, 2002) [hereinafter, Vasiljevic, 
Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Stakic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 732, Case No. IT-97-24-T (July 31, 2003) 
[hereinafter, Stakic, Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 47, Case No. IT-
95-9-T (Oct. 17, 2003) [hereinafter, Simic, Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Judgment, 
ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 634, Case No. IT-98-34-T (Mar. 31, 2003) [hereinafter, Naletilic, Trial Judgment]. 
209 Kupreskic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 621, Case No. IT-95-16-T (Jan. 14, 2000) [hereinafter, Kupreskic, 
Trial Judgment].  
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two are similar, the Appeals Chamber has predominantly used the two-part definition in recent 
cases.210    
The first element of the definition of persecution comprises two sub-elements: 1) the act 
or omission must discriminate in fact; and 2) the act or omission must deny or infringe upon a 
fundamental right.  Regarding the first sub-element, early Tribunal jurisprudence held that the 
actus reus must have discriminatory consequences in fact, that is, there is a discriminatory 
element to the actus reus, in that discriminatory intent alone was not sufficient.211  In Kvocka, 
however, the Trial Chamber rejected this approach, instead stating that "if a person was targeted 
for abuse because she was suspected of belonging to the Muslim group, the discrimination 
element is met even if the suspicion proves inaccurate."212  This seemed to be an anomaly as the 
Trial Chamber in Krnojelac later contradicted Kvocka on this point, noting that "[t]he existence 
of a mistaken belief that the intended victim will be discriminated against, together with an 
intention to discriminate against that person because of that mistaken belief, may in some 
circumstances amount to the inchoate offence of attempted persecution, but no such crime falls 
within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal."213  The Trial Chamber in Krnojelac sided with what it 
deemed to be the view consistently taken since the Tribunal first addressed the issue (minus the 
Kvocka Trial Chamber decision),214 and stated that it is the discriminatory consequences in 
addition to the discriminatory intent that give persecution its unique character and sets it apart 
                                                 
210 See, e.g., Kvocka, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 320; Krnojelac, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 185; Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, 
Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 113, Case No. IT-98-32-A (Feb. 25, 2004) [hereinafter, Vasiljevic, Appeals 
Judgment]; Blaskic, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 131; Kordic and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 101.  
211 Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, ¶ 432.  
212 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, ¶ 195, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T (Nov. 2, 2001) 
[hereinafter, Kvocka, Trial Judgment]. 
213 Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, n.1292. 
214 Id. ¶ 432. 
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from other crimes against humanity.215  But again, the Tribunal changed course on this point and 
stated in Brdjanin that persecution can occur in the case of mistaken identity.216  
The second sub-element (i.e., that the act or omission must deny or infringe upon a 
fundamental right) is less concrete.  The Statute of the ICTY does not provide a list of acts that 
may constitute persecutions as a crime against humanity, but the Tribunal has established a 
jurisdictional limit.  The Appeals Chamber in Kordic and Cerkez stated that "the acts underlying 
persecutions as a crime against humanity, whether considered in isolation or in conjunction with 
other acts, must constitute a crime of persecutions of gravity equal to the crimes listed in Article 
5 of the Statute."217  Thus, the act must "constitute a denial of or infringement upon a 
fundamental right laid down in international customary or treaty law,"218 and for purposes of 
legality, the act must have constituted a crime against humanity in either customary international 
law or international treaty law at the time of commission.219   
 Notably, all persecutions will involve the denial of a fundamental human right but not all 
denials of fundamental human rights will constitute persecution.220  Certain denials may not 
reach the level of seriousness required.  Determining what constitutes a denial or infringement 
upon a fundamental right is imprecise but the contents of the Statute provide a foundation. 
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 The criminal acts underlying a charge of persecution may be enumerated within Article 5 
or elsewhere in the Statute, or may even be found outside the Statute.221  Crimes enumerated in 
Article 5 are "by definition" serious enough to constitute a crime against humanity.  For instance, 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, and other 
inhumane acts will all sustain a charge of persecution.  Other crimes enumerated elsewhere in the 
Statute as well as those not enumerated in the Statute, must meet an additional test.  They "must 
reach the same level of gravity as the other crimes against humanity enumerated in Article 5 of 
the Statute," which "will only be met by gross or blatant denials of fundamental human 
rights."222  Interestingly, the language of this test mirrors language used in the earlier definition 
of persecution provided by the Tribunal.  Several crimes found within Article 2 are also found 
within Article 5, and thus, they undoubtedly meet the gravity test and require no analytical 
justification.223   
Crimes not enumerated within the Statute itself but that may rise to the level of the 
Article 5 crimes include, for example, the use of human shields224 and outrages upon personal 
dignity, including harassment, humiliation, and psychological abuse.225  An example of a crime 
that does not in itself constitute persecution would be unlawful arrest.226  The crime constitutes 
the denial and infringement upon a personal right, but standing alone, it does not amount to the 
level of gravity as the enumerated Article 5 crimes against humanity.  The unlawful arrest would 
need to be combined with other acts, such as unlawful detention or inhumane living conditions, 
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in order to warrant a finding of persecution.227  In this respect, the Tribunal takes a holistic 
approach when determining whether a set of circumstances, rather than an individual act, 
combine to form the crime of persecution. 
 Significantly, physical injury to the person is not required for there to have been 
persecution.  The Blaskic Appeals Chamber favorably quoted the Trial Judgment, stating that 
persecutions "may take forms other than injury to the human person, in particular those acts 
rendered serious not by their apparent cruelty but by the discrimination they seek to instill within 
humankind."228  Therefore, the confiscation or destruction of private dwellings and businesses, 
symbolic or historical buildings, or the means of subsistence, may all constitute persecution.229  
Attacks on personal property might even warrant a finding of persecution if the attack was 
committed with the requisite discriminatory intent.  Whereas an attack on the physical person 
may not be as contextually-based, instances dealing with the arguably less-serious attack on 
personal property require a high degree of contextualization.  For example, the burning of a car, 
by itself, does not amount to persecution.  However, if that car was the only means of transport 
the head-of-household had to get to work and go to market, and was essential to the family's 
survival, then a finding of persecution may be more warranted.230  Attacks on communal 
property also may amount to persecution.  The destruction of and damage to religious and 
educational institutions might arise to the level of gravity as those crimes enumerated in Article 
5.231
The appropriate method of deducing whether a crime has reached the requisite level of 
gravity is elusive.  Based on the Tribunal's decisions, it is unclear how to consider fully the 
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interplay between the first and second elements of persecution (i.e., the relationship between the 
act and the discriminatory intent) in determining what crimes may amount to persecution.  What 
factor or factors contribute to the gravity analysis in determining the seriousness of the crime?  In 
other words, should the court determine whether the act itself (considered without any 
discriminatory intent) reaches the same gravity, essentially considering the act in a vacuum?  Or 
may an act reach the level of gravity by way of the act when combined with discriminatory 
intent, thus taking a more contextually-based approach?   
In Blaskic, the Appeals Chamber considered whether the Trial Chamber appropriately 
addressed this issue.  The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had erred in failing to 
consider the gravity of the underlying acts by themselves, and held that "it is not enough that the 
underlying acts be perpetrated with a discriminatory intent."232  The Trial Chamber had 
"appeared to consider, erroneously, that underlying acts are rendered sufficiently grave if they 
are committed with a discriminatory intent."233  This view was supported by the Appeals 
Chamber in Kordic and Cerkez, which stated that "not every act, if committed with the requisite 
discriminatory intent, amounts to persecutions as a crime against humanity."234  This language, 
however, does not fully settle the issue.  At other points in the Blaskic judgment, the Appeals 
Chamber approvingly quoted the Trial Chamber, stating that "'the crime of 'persecution' 
encompasses not only bodily and mental harm and infringements upon individual freedom but 
also acts which appear less serious, such as those targeting property, so long as the victimized 
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persons were specially selected on grounds linked to their belonging to a particular 
community.'"235  The Appeals Chamber further quoted the Trial Chamber:  
It is the specific intent to cause injury to a human being because he belongs to a particular community or 
group, rather than the means employed to achieve it, that bestows on it its individual nature and gravity and 
which justifies its being able to constitute criminal acts which might appear in themselves not to infringe 
directly upon the most elementary rights of a human being, for example, attacks on property.  In other 
words, the perpetrator of the acts of persecution does not initially target the individual but rather 
membership in a specific racial, religious or political group.236   
 
By focusing on the discriminatory nature of the act, as opposed to the act itself, the number of 
acts includable becomes limitless.  In Kvocka, the Trial Chamber raised holdings by World War 
II trials that found certain denials to Jews, such as the freedom to marry, to bank accounts, and to 
educational and employment opportunities, constituted persecution, and thus, "acts that are not 
inherently criminal may nonetheless become criminal and persecutorial if committed with 
discriminatory intent."237  Such an approach allows any act to become persecution by sole reason 
of its discriminatory application.   
The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic proposed a method for determining what acts may 
constitute persecution, but it does not fully complete the issue.  The court simply rehashes 
previous statements that the court should first determine whether the act underlying the 
persecution constituted a crime against humanity in customary international law, which in turn 
must involve a denial or infringement upon a fundamental right granted under customary 
international law.238  The proposal suggests that not every act, even if committed with 
discriminatory intent, would amount to a persecution as a crime against humanity.239  The 
principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege, must be considered throughout the process,240 in 
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that the Tribunal may only convict someone of a crime if it was a violation of customary 
international law or international treaty law at the time of commission.241  But despite this 
attempted formulation, and its focus on the significance of the act itself in examining whether it 
amounts to persecution, the Appeals Chamber in Blaskic, as well as in Kordic and Cerkez, fails 
to state outright the role of discriminatory intent in the analysis of gravity.       
A proposed clarification, then, would be to consider only the act itself, without any 
consideration of potential or alleged discriminatory intent, and determine whether the act is of 
equal gravity as the enumerated crimes in Article 5.  If the act, standing alone, reaches the level 
of rape or murder, for example, then the act will constitute persecution when committed with 
discriminatory intent.  Allowing acts to become persecution simply by way of an evil intent 
behind them is a dangerous precedent and is tantamount to hate crimes statutes, legislation that is 
not altogether popular in the U.S.  This type of analysis would provide the Tribunal with clarity 
and fairness in determining what acts may constitute persecution.  
The second part in the definition of persecution—the mental element—also consists of 
several parts.  In addition to the three intents required for all crimes against humanity, which are 
the knowledge of an attack, the knowledge that his criminal acts are a part of that attack, and the 
intent to commit the underlying act, the act must also have been committed with the specific 
intent to discriminate on political, religious, or racial grounds.242  The Statute conjunctively lists 
the three grounds: "persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds";243 but nevertheless, 
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the Tribunal rejected the notion that all three bases must be present in order to constitute 
persecution.244  Only one ground is necessary to establish a finding of persecution.245
The distinct mental element of persecution sets it apart from other crimes.  The crime of 
persecution, when considered amongst the other crimes against humanity, "derives its unique 
character from the requirement of a specific discriminatory intent."246  For this discriminatory 
intent, "[i]t is not sufficient for the accused to be aware that he is in fact acting in a way that is 
discriminatory; he must consciously intend to discriminate.  While the intent to discriminate need 
not be the primary intent with respect to the act, it must be a significant one."247  As with crimes 
against humanity in general, persecution does not require the existence of a plan or policy to 
discriminate, and if a plan or policy does exist, there is no requirement that the accused be aware 
that his persecutory act is a part of the larger plan or policy. 
One important question is the manner in which the prosecution may establish and the 
Trial Chamber may find discriminatory intent.  Documents and other incriminating direct 
evidence of the perpetrator's intent are often lacking or difficult to obtain.248  The prosecution 
has attempted to remedy this by inferring discriminatory intent for the individual act from the 
general discriminatory nature of a broader attack.  Early cases appeared to support this stance,249 
but later cases were more equivocal.  Although the Appeals Chamber in Kvocka stated that 
discriminatory intent may not be inferred solely from the discriminatory nature of an attack, it 
also stated that intent "may be inferred from such a context as long as, in view of the facts of the 
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case, circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged acts substantiate the existence of 
such intent."250  Those circumstances include the "systematic nature of the crimes committed 
against a racial or religious group and the general attitude of the alleged perpetrator as 
demonstrated by his behaviour."251  Inferring discriminatory intent for a specific individual act 
from the discriminatory nature of a larger attack may result in the correct conclusion for many of 
the acts committed within that discriminatory context, but not correct for others because "there 
may be acts committed within the context that were committed either on discriminatory grounds 
not listed in the Statute, or for purely personal reasons."252  There must be evidence linking a 
discriminatory intent to the specific act rather than the attack in general, which, as explained 
above, does not need be discriminatory.253   
Despite its alleged reluctance, on several occasions the Tribunal has inferred 
discriminatory intent from larger contextual attacks.254  For example, in Krnojelac and Kvocka 
the Appeals Chamber found that beatings and detentions, respectively, were perpetrated largely 
against the non-Serb population, and therefore, it was reasonable to conclude that the individual 
acts were committed based on discriminatory purposes, involving the requisite discriminatory 
intent.255  Specifically, in Kvocka, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber's inferred 
discriminatory intent as a result of the accused's "knowledge of the persecutory nature of the 
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crimes, and his knowing participation in the system of persecution pervading Omarska camp."256  
In another example, in its legal finding on General Krstic's responsibility for alleged 
persecutions, the Trial Chamber found him guilty but did not address the specific intent of 
General Krstic, instead quickly summating in a one-sentence paragraph that "[t]he Trial Chamber 
has previously determined that a widespread and systematic attack was launched against the 
Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica from 11 July onwards, by reason of their belonging to 
the Bosnian Muslim group."257  The Trial Chamber then concluded that the crime of persecution 
had been committed.258  Thus, despite language suggesting that discriminatory intent may not be 
inferred from the general discriminatory nature of the attack, it appears that a perpetrator's 
discriminatory intent may be inferred from knowledge of the surrounding events.   
Another means through which the Tribunal has found intent is based on the perpetrator's 
apparent tendencies.  In Kordic and Cerkez, the Appeals Chamber found the requisite 
discriminatory intent for persecutions, based on evidence "concerning Kordic's political activities 
and inclinations, his strongly nationalist and ethnical stance, and his desire to attain the sovereign 
Croatian state within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at seemingly any cost."259  This 
suggests that one's general racist, discriminatory attitude towards a certain people is enough to 
justify finding one's individual acts are discriminatory, essentially discrimination per se.  This 
effectively shifts the burden of proof to the defense, having to prove that he committed the act 
with a non-discriminatory intent.  Such a burden-shifting scheme is anathematic to the basic 
principles of criminal law, whether in the municipal or international arena. 
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 Notably, a discriminatory intent should not be confused with a "persecutory intent."  The 
former is the signature element of persecutions as a crime against humanity whereas the latter is 
not required.260  The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic stated that "there is no requirement in law that 
the actor possess a 'persecutory intent' over and above a discriminatory intent."261  In other 
words, "a showing of a specific persecutory intent behind an alleged persecutory plan or policy, 
that is, the removal of targeted persons from society or humanity, is not required to establish the 
mens rea of the perpetrator carrying out the underlying physical acts of persecutions."262
 Discriminatory intent should not be confused or conflated with motive.  The Appeals 
Chamber in Kvocka distinguished motive from discriminatory intent, agreeing with the Trial 
Chamber that "crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal reasons,"263 and 
that "[p]ersonal motives, such as settling old scores, or seeking personal gain, do not exclude 
discriminatory intent."264  Motive is only relevant at the sentencing stage for purposes of 
mitigation or aggravation; it plays no role in the finding of criminal intent.265
Yet despite the court's valid attempt in Kvocka to distinguish motive from discriminatory 
intent, the approach it used seemingly discounted the express language of the Statute that 
requires the specific intent to discriminate on one of only three grounds: racial, religious, or 
political.  Crimes against humanity in general, because they do not require a discriminatory 
intent, may be committed for purely personal reasons.  Persecution, conversely, requires 
discriminatory intent, and the court in Kvocka should have specified that persecution may not be 
committed on the basis of purely personal reasons (unless, of course, those personal reasons were 
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based on discrimination).  For example, if a Bosnian Serb killed a Bosnian Muslim on the basis 
of his ethnicity, say, in the name of a Greater Serbia, persecution certainly has occurred.  
However, if the Serb took advantage of the chaos ensuing in a conflict and opportunistically 
killed the Muslim for purposes of an old debt, the basis for the act was not discriminatory, 
especially not on the basis of the three grounds.  Nonetheless, the Kvocka Appeals Chamber 
attempted to illustrate the interconnectedness of a discriminatory intent and the motive:  
Edin Ganic only became a possible object of Zigic's demands because he was detained as a Muslim and 
could offer no resistance, whereas Zigic was, as a member of the security forces, in a position of authority 
over him.  The discriminatory intent and the personal covetous motive are not mutually exclusive, rather 
closely interlocked.  In fact, the coercive demands for money from the detainees helped to create the 
atmosphere of insecurity, harassment and humiliation in the camps.266   
 
The situation described above occurred only after a Muslim had been detained on discriminatory 
grounds, and despite a potentially non-discriminatory personal motive for extorting money, the 
Appeals Chamber upheld the conviction.   
This approach effectively eliminates the specific intent required in persecutions, and 
lowers the requisite mens rea to one of knowledge that the perpetrator's position over the victim 
(which allows for the personal motive to be acted upon) was based on discriminatory grounds.  
This suggests that even if the motivation was purely personal, but that the accused was aware of 
a larger discriminatory attack, he would be considered to have the requisite discriminatory intent, 
despite his purely personal reasons for committing the specific act.  This is further reinforced by 
the notion that the crime of persecution targets the group rather than the individual, and thus, if 
one kills another for purposes of a debt or family reprisal, the individual has been targeted rather 
than the group.267
 What if discriminatory intent is only part of the reason for perpetrating the crime?  
According to the Trial Chamber in Krnojelac, "[w]hile the intent to discriminate need not be the 
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primary intent with respect to the act, it must be a significant one."268  This raises further 
questions.  Does "significant" mean more than 50-50?  If the intent to discriminate does not need 
to the be the "primary intent," then other reasons may be the predominant reason, with 
discriminatory intent only being an additional thought, or perhaps even an after-thought.  Taking 
this language to its natural conclusion, the Tribunal could, according to Krnojelac, find 
persecution when an individual decided to rob an individual for purely financial gain, as long as 
that individual harbored any discriminatory intent whatsoever.  Consider an armed Kosovar 
Albanian approaching another man on the street at night intending to rob him, unknowing that 
his intended victim was Serbian.  The Kosovar Albanian shouts at the man to give him his 
money, and the man responds in a distinct Serbian accent.  The Kosovar Albanian shouts again, 
and this time interjects a racial slur.  Does this constitute discriminatory intent, and is it 
"significant" enough to constitute persecution?  Because persecution is a unique crime distinct 
from other crimes against humanity, and other crimes in general, this question should be 
answered in the negative.  In order to amount to persecution, discriminatory intent should be the 
primary intent; it need not be the only intent, but it should be the primary intent for perpetrating 
the underlying criminal act. 
 
 
IV. Justifications for Criminalizing Persecution: Cues from Bias Crimes Legislation 
in the U.S. 
 
The rich debate in the U.S. on the validity and wisdom of bias crimes legislation sheds 
light on the nature of persecution and its enforcement.  Although bias crimes are popularly 
referred to as "hate crimes," such characterization is a misnomer and does not properly 
encompass the scope of these crimes.  Depending on the statute, the crux of a bias crime is 
                                                 
268 Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, ¶ 435 (emphasis added). 
7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 92   
prejudice rather than hate, that is, bias crimes may be committed without hate, and crimes may 
be committed with hate but are not necessarily a bias crime.269  Some statutes do, however, 
require ill-will and animus toward the victim. 
Like the persecution clause in Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute, all state and federal bias 
crimes statutes list categories of classes that may not be discriminated against (e.g., race, color, 
ethnicity, national origin, and religion).270  Determining what classes to protect against should be 
considered with the larger social context in mind.271  Classes traditionally subjected to 
discrimination and victim to widespread antipathy are justifiable inclusions.272
Professor Frederick M. Lawrence separates bias crime statues into three distinct models: 
the "discriminatory selection" model, the "racial animus model," and the "because of" or "by 
reason" formulations.273  The "discriminatory selection model" defines the crime in terms of the 
perpetrator's discriminatory and intentional selection of the victim; the prejudice occurs at the 
selection process.  Hate, racial animosity, or any other reason need not play a role in the selection 
as long as the victim was selected on the basis of that particular characteristic.  The "racial 
animus model" defines crimes in terms of the perpetrator's prejudicial motivation in selecting the 
victim.274  The perpetrator selected the particular victim on the basis of racial animosity towards 
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that victim's class.275  The third model tends to blur the distinction between the first two models, 
and statutes within this category are not always clear what and how they will punish under their 
statutes.  If applying Lawrence's trichotomy to the ICTY, it could be said that the Tribunal 
follows the discriminatory model approach. 
Opponents of bias crimes statutes have challenged their constitutionality, but the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently upheld a state law based on the discriminatory selection model.276  The 
statute at issue in Wisconsin v. Mitchell called for a penalty enhancement for crimes committed 
with animus.  On top of the two years for aggravated battery, the defendant would receive five 
additional years as a result of the enhancement.  Wisconsin argued that the reason for selecting 
the victim, such as racial animosity or ill-will toward the group, was irrelevant.  The only 
relevant factor was whether he selected the victim based on a listed class.  The defendant argued 
that the statute violated the First Amendment by punishing thoughts, which is what the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously held.277  The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and 
ultimately upheld the law, finding that the penalty enhancement was aimed at conduct not 
protected by the First Amendment, but it is not altogether clear whether the Court 
wholeheartedly accepted the discriminatory model.278
After establishing the constitutionality of bias crimes legislation, it is interesting to 
consider who might be liable for such crimes.  In the only U.S. case found by this author that 
involves accomplice liability for a bias crime, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals vacated a bias 
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crime penalty enhancement because the jury had not been properly instructed on that particular 
theory of party-to-a-crime liability.279  The case involved a group of four Asian men that shouted 
racial epithets at an African-American man after he exited a convenience store.  They attacked 
the man and continued the racial slur onslaught.  Other Asian individuals then converged on the 
scene and the group grew to over fifteen.  The defendant, an Asian male, who was perhaps the 
ninth individual to arrive, joined in the beating along with the others.  Racial slurs continued 
throughout the attack, including before and after the defendant arrived.  
The jury found him liable for the bias crime penalty enhancement, which increased his 
crime from a misdemeanor to a felony punishable by up to two years' imprisonment.  On appeal 
the defendant argued that the jury instructions improperly allowed the jury to find him liable for 
the penalty enhancement even absent a finding that he was aware the victim had been selected on 
discriminatory grounds.  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals raised the issue of whether an 
accomplice may be held liable for a bias crime under the "natural and foreseeable consequences" 
doctrine where the accomplice was unaware of the discriminatory selection.  The state argued 
that such a finding was possible.  Instead of ruling on that issue, though, the court of appeals 
focused solely on the jury instructions, holding that the instructions allowed the jury to find him 
liable for his co-perpetrators' discriminatory selection even though he was unaware of it.  
Because that theory of vicarious liability had not been presented in the jury instructions, the court 
vacated the enhancement.280  Although the court did not expressly allow or disallow vicarious 
                                                 
279 State v. Yang, 265 Wis.2d 937, 664 N.W.2d 683 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).  
280 Id.  The jury instructions read:  
"'Was the victim of the crime of battery intentionally selected because of his race by the defendant or by 
another person who committed the battery?'  Before you may answer this question 'yes,' you must be 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Jay Jay Anjewel [victim] was intentionally selected in whole or in 
part because of his race by the defendant or another person who committed the battery.  If you are satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jay Jay Anjewel was selected in whole or in part because of his race by the 
defendant …or by another person who committed the battery, you should answer the question 'yes' as to 
that defendant." 
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liability for bias crimes, this is the only case that has raised the issue.  The lack of case law 
provides an opportunity to examine fully the merits of employing vicarious liability for bias 
crimes. 
When considering whether to hold an accomplice liable for the "natural and probable 
consequences" of, for example, a robbery, a court assesses the situation objectively.  If two 
armed individuals walk into a liquor store, is the killing of the cashier by one of the assailants a 
natural and probable consequence of the plan to rob the store?  Under traditional accomplice 
liability theory, the answer is yes.  The non-shooting participant in the robbery could have 
foreseen this result as being a natural and probable consequence of the original crime (armed 
robbery), and therefore, that individual is held responsible as a direct perpetrator for the 
additional crime (murder).  The foreseeability is objectively measured. 
But should we apply this same logic to bias crimes, where a co-perpetrator subjectively 
harbors discriminatory thoughts?  Is it objectively foreseeable that the partner-in-crime would 
discriminatorily select another in the commission of a crime?  To answer this question a court 
must consider the direct perpetrator subjectively, that is, it must add personality and context to 
the individual's thoughts, and perhaps his actions.  The metamorphosis from an armed robbery to 
a murder is not difficult for a reasonable person to comprehend; the transition from an armed 
robbery to murder because of the victim's race is highly abnormal.  The latter situation is 
atypical, and thus, from an objective standpoint, the commission of a bias crime would never be 
a natural and probable consequence of another crime unless the court looks into the mind of the 
direct perpetrator.  This leads back to a subjective standard.  Therefore, a defendant would be 
                                                                                                                                                             
According to the court of appeals, this left the jury three choices: first, find the defendant personally selected the 
victim on the basis of race; second, find that "another person who committed the battery" selected the victim on the 
basis of race; or third, find that no one had intentionally selected the victim on the basis of race.  Under these 
instructions, the court of appeals concluded that the jury could have imposed the bias crime penalty enhancement 
liability regardless of the defendant's awareness of any such discriminatory selection. 
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liable not only for his accomplice's direct acts but also for the reasons his accomplice committed 
those crimes.  A defendant could essentially be held liable for his accomplice's thoughts.   
But why are bias crimes, and by comparison the crime of persecution, so bad and why 
should they be legislated against?  Why should they be considered separate from their underlying 
criminal offense?  Bias crimes are often assumed to be worse than other crimes.  The murdering 
of a liquor store owner to get at his cash register receives less public attention than when a group 
of young white men attack and kill an African-American, or when a neo-Nazi assaults a Jewish 
man while shouting racial epithets.  We generally perceive crimes on the basis of skin color, 
national origin, or any other immutable characteristic to be morally reprehensible.  Those crimes 
are often considered more serious than the same crime when committed in the absence of 
prejudicial motivation.  Should this be the case? 
Proponents defend bias crimes legislation on several grounds.  First, the perpetrator's 
motive makes him more culpable.  We regularly equate one's motive with culpability, e.g., many 
perceive a husband facilitating his terminally-ill wife's voluntary poisoning as being less 
culpable than the same husband killing his healthy wife for the insurance proceeds.281  Second, 
bias crimes may result in greater physical and psychological impact on the victim.  The victim 
may suffer not only from an increased physical injury, usually due to the violent and group-based 
nature of bias crimes, but also from severe psychological problems.282  The victim might become 
more isolated, reserved from society, lose relationships, etc.  Third, bias crimes greatly affect the 
group to whom the victim belonged.283  A bias crime "attacks the victim not only physically but 
                                                 
281 JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS 80 (1998). 
282 Jacobs and Potter do not accept this argument.  The authors suggest that empirical data do not show that bias 
crimes are more physically violent than regular crimes, or that victims of bias crimes are subject to more 
psychological impact than victims of non-bias crimes.  Id. at 82-84. 
283 Jacobs and Potter do not agree with this argument either.  The authors suggest that many crimes have impacts on 
others, e.g., brutal rape in a park makes others feel threatened and they change their lifestyle, or a string of 
abductions that make parents feel threatened.  Id. at 86-88. 
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at the very core of his identity.  It is an attack from which there is no escape."284  When an 
African-American man is targeted and attacked by a group of white men, African-Americans in 
that community may feel threatened and vulnerable and begin to fear all whites, or may alter 
their lifestyle, such as not shopping, eating, or walking in that neighborhood.  African-Americans 
will feel as though they were attacked personally, because a fellow member of their class was 
attacked, and the arbitrary nature of the crime suggests that it easily could have been them 
instead of the unfortunate victim.  Additionally, members of that class will feel a reverse 
collective animosity, in that African-Americans will feel angry towards all whites even though 
only one or a few individuals perpetrated the heinous crime.  Fourth, bias crimes affect society as 
a whole.  Bias crimes "can frighten and humiliate other members of the community" and 
"reinforce social divisions and hatred."285  Individuals will withdraw from community activity, 
public interaction will decrease, and conflicts may erupt.  The Oregon Supreme Court, in 
upholding a bias crime statute, stated:  
[Hate crime] creates a harm to society distinct from and greater than the harm caused by the assault alone.  
Such crimes—because they are directed not only toward the victim but, in essence, toward an entire group 
of which the victim is perceived to be a member—invite imitation, retaliation, and insecurity on the part of 
persons in the group to which the victim was perceived by the assailants to belong.286   
 
Other rationales given for criminalizing bias crimes include moral education and their greater 
deterrence factor. 
Professor Allison Danner advances another (and unique) justification for punishing bias 
crimes, arguing that bias crimes are legitimately punishable when seen through the prism of 
crimes against humanity.  Rather than advocating the wrongfulness-culpability model of 
punishment, which focuses on the individual motivations for the act, she focuses on the 
                                                 
284 LAWRENCE, supra note 269, at 40. 
285 JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 281, at 86 (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Justifications for Defining 
Crimes by the Category of Victim, ANNUAL SURVEY OF AM. L. 617, 627 (1992/1993)). 
286 State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Ore. 1992). 
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individual's "choice to act in a particular way within his social context."287  Danner argues that 
the person who acted discriminatorily, regardless of his motivations, should be punished when he 
knew how his acts fit within the larger social context and how those acts would affect society as 
a whole.   
All of these reasons, whether successfully argued or not, pertain to justifying the 
punishment of bias crimes in general.  Many of the same reasons are easily applicable to 
justifying the criminalization of persecution.  These reasons do not, however, speak to the 
punishment of the individual.  Justifications for criminal punishment generally fall within two 
schools of punishment theory: retribution and "consequentalist."288  Retribution theory focuses 
on making the criminal pay for his crime, essentially the eye-for-an-eye rationale.  The 
"consequentalist" theory of punishment seeks to improve the overall well-being of a society in a 
utilitarian fashion.289  This theory encompasses four methods in obtaining the maximum utility: 
general deterrence, specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.290
When taking these theories of punishment into account, we see that holding one liable for 
another's discriminatory act simply because the direct perpetrator's acts were foreseeable to the 
other does not bode well with any of these theories.  If society condemns discriminatory behavior 
and requires retribution, then society will improperly hold one responsible for a crime he did not 
intend.  Two methods of the consequentialist theory—rehabilitation and incapacitation—
similarly fail.  An individual who does not harbor bias (or hate) towards certain groups cannot be 
rehabilitated—there is no rehabilitation to occur!  Incapacitation will not serve any purpose 
                                                 
287 Allison Marston Danner, Bias Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Culpability in Context, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 389, 405-06 (2002). 
288 LAWRENCE, supra note 269, at 58. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 99   
because it is not likely, based on the unintended discriminatory consequences of his crime, that 
society will be any safer from discriminatory-based crimes than before incarceration.   
The methods of deterrence offer more, although still extremely limited, promise for 
advocates of vicarious liability for bias crimes and persecution.  Aspiring criminals may be 
dissuaded from engaging in any criminal behavior for fear that their co-perpetrator may commit 
a crime on discriminatory grounds.  Although highly unlikely, these individuals might stay at 
home altogether.  The same holds true for specific deterrence.  If someone is punished for the 
bias crime or persecution by another, that person may forego any criminal behavior for fear of 
future penalty enhancement due to his discrimination-motivated partner-in-crime.  Both specific 
and general deterrence, however, have very limited utility with respect to punishing an individual 
for the thoughts of another.   
 
 
V. The Convergence of Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability and Specific Intent 
Crimes 
 
The crimes of persecution (as a crime against humanity) and genocide are two specific 
intent crimes that have figured prominently in the development of the ICTY.  Because the 
Tribunal has considered the crimes to come from the same genus, in that the crux of both crimes 
is the intent to target certain persons based on their belonging to a particular group,291 both 
crimes are examined here.  In fact, "from the viewpoint of mens rea, genocide is an extreme and 
more inhuman form of persecution."292   
As discussed above, the crime of persecution requires a specific discriminatory intent, 
based on political, racial, or religious grounds.  This mens rea is higher than for other crimes 
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against humanity, but lower than that required for genocide,293 which requires the intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, an entire ethnic group.294  Also noted above, JCE liability requires 
the intent to participate in that enterprise.  This leads to yet another interesting question: In 
addition to the intent to participate in a criminal enterprise, does a participant also need to share 
the specific intent (i.e., discriminatory intent) for specific intent crimes, before liability attaches 
to such crimes? 
 The Appeals Chamber in Kvocka did not deem it relevant to distinguish between the 
intents, stating that:  
in the context of the case, the intent to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise and discriminatory intent is 
one and the same thing.  The same conclusion must then be reached when determining whether the facts of 
the case could have led a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Kvocka shared the discriminatory intent 
of the perpetrators of the crimes committed in furtherance of the joint criminal enterprise.295   
 
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber's finding that Kvocka had the intent to 
contribute to the JCE, and therefore, he necessarily had the intent to discriminate.296  When 
Kvocka apparently asserted that "the Trial Chamber erred by not systematically analysing the 
discriminatory nature of the crimes committed in Omarska camp," the Appeals Chamber referred 
to the finding of the discriminatory intent of the JCE, thus apparently satisfying the requisite 
mens rea.297  According to the Kvocka judgment, the prosecution need not establish a 
discriminatory intent for each single act (if there are multiple acts), as long as it proves that the 
JCE was discriminatory and that the individual joined the JCE.  This leads to yet another 
question: does the original fundamental purpose of the JCE need to have been discriminatory in 
nature, or does the JCE simply need to have committed acts discriminatorily? 
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The Appeals Chamber in Kvocka addressed the issue of whether a participant in a JCE 
needs to share the discriminatory intent for special intent crimes, and affirmed the Trial 
Chamber's holding:  
Where the crime requires special intent … the accused must also satisfy the additional requirements 
imposed by the crime, such as the intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds if he is a 
co-perpetrator.  However, if he is an aider or abettor, he need only have knowledge of the perpetrator's 
shared intent.  This shared knowledge too can be inferred from the circumstances.  If the criminal enterprise 
entails random killing for financial profit, for instance, that would not necessarily demonstrate an intent to 
discriminate on "political, racial or religious grounds".  If the criminal enterprise entails killing members of 
a particular ethnic group, and members of that ethnic group were of a differing religion, race, or political 
group than the co-perpetrators, that would demonstrate an intent to discriminate on political, racial, or 
religious grounds.  Thus, a knowing and continued participation in this enterprise could evince an intent to 
persecute members of the targeted ethnic group.298   
 
Kvocka illustrates the distinction between co-perpetratorship and aiding and abetting.  For first- 
and second-category JCE, participants "must be shown to share the required intent of the 
principal perpetrators.  Thus, for crimes of persecution, the Prosecution must demonstrate that 
the accused shared the common discriminatory intent of the joint criminal enterprise."299  But 
"[i]f the accused does not share the discriminatory intent, then he may still be liable as an aider 
and abettor if he knowingly makes a substantial contribution to the crime."300  
 With respect to third-category JCE, the prosecution must show two distinct intents, each 
from a different person.  First, the direct perpetrator of the crime must have possessed the 
specific discriminatory intent, and second, the accused must have been "aware" that the crime 
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the agreed-upon JCE.301  The meaning of 
foreseeability—i.e., whether it connotes a mere "possibility" of the crime occurring or whether 
"certainty" is required302—has been resolved by the Trial Chamber in Krstic, stating that the 
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prosecution only needs to prove that "the accused was aware that the further crime was a 
possible consequence" of the agreed-upon JCE.303
  
A. The Relationship Between Joint Criminal Enterprise and Genocide 
International criminal lawyers and human rights activists, along with public, generally 
perceive genocide to be the most shocking of all crimes.  The term alone evokes images of 
unspeakable acts and mass graves from Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan.  Because of its powerful 
connotation, States even reserve the word for very limited cases, fearing that the mere mention of 
genocide will force them to take positive action.304  With such a level of seriousness, both 
through the prism of law and in the eyes of the public, is genocide compatible with JCE liability?   
In Stakic the prosecution sought conviction of genocide on the basis of the third-category 
JCE.  The Trial Chamber expressly rejected this basis of liability as being proper for genocide, 
stating that "the concept of genocide as a natural and foreseeable consequence of an enterprise 
not aiming specifically at genocide does not suffice."305  The Trial Chamber further expounded:  
Conflating the third variant of joint criminal enterprise and the crime of genocide would result in the dolus 
specialis being so watered down that it is extinguished.  Thus, the Trial Chamber finds that in order to 
"commit" genocide, the elements of that crime, including the dolus specialis must be met.  The notions of 
"escalation" to genocide, or genocide as a "natural and foreseeable consequence" of an enterprise not aimed 
specifically at genocide are not compatible with the definition of genocide under Article 4(3)(a).306   
 
The Trial Chamber subsequently acquitted Stakic of genocide under third-category JCE.307  
The Trial Chamber in Brdjanin reasoned similarly but the Appeals Chamber overruled 
that decision, holding that an accused may be held liable for any crime that is beyond the agreed-
                                                 
303 Krstic, Trial Judgment, ¶ 613. 
304 The political debates in the U.S. in 1994 and in 2004 surrounding the events in, respectively, Rwanda and Sudan 
illustrate that governments are reluctant to use the word "genocide" for fear that they will be legally bound to take 
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find any of his subordinates had the requisite dolus specialis. 
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upon JCE, including those with a specific intent requirement, provided that the relevant standard 
is met.308  The accused must have entered into a JCE to commit a specific crime and knew that 
the commission of the agreed-upon crime made it reasonably foreseeable to him that a separate 
crime would be committed by other members of the JCE.  Genocide is treated the same as crimes 
with no specific intent requirement; the prosecution simply needs to establish that "it was 
reasonably foreseeable to the accused that an act specified in Article 4(2) would be committed 
and that it would be committed with genocidal intent."309   
Strikingly, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that third-category JCE is a "lower mens 
rea standard" than the other two categories.310  The Appeals Chamber's characterization of third-
category JCE liability simply requires the prosecution to "prove only awareness on the part of the 
accused that genocide was a foreseeable consequence of the commission of a separate agreed-
upon crime.  This awareness of the likelihood of genocide being committed is not as strict a mens 
rea requirement as the specific intent required to establish the crime of genocide."311  The 
Appeals Chamber's adherence to mere "awareness," and its own admission that this particular 
mens rea does not amount to the "specific intent" for genocide, is difficult to defend.  Genocide 
will always subsume many individual acts; genocide, by definition, comprises hundreds or 
perhaps thousands of individual crimes: rape, murder, expulsion.  Each of those instances 
generally falls within one of the other crimes enumerated in the ICTY Statute, most likely under 
crimes against humanity or violations of the laws and customs of war.  Whenever an individual 
commits an individual act within a JCE, under the Brdjanin reasoning he may be found guilty of 
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genocide without intending any such event as long as genocide was a foreseeable consequence of 
the JCE.   
 In explaining its decision the Appeals Chamber referred to other forms of criminal 
liability that do not require specific proof of the intent to commit the actual crime, namely, aiding 
and abetting, which merely requires "knowledge on the part of the accused and substantial 
contribution with that knowledge."312  The Appeals Chamber further explained that with respect 
to aiding and abetting persecution:  
An accused will be held criminally responsible as an aider and abettor of the crime of persecution where, 
the accused is aware of the criminal act, and that the criminal act was committed with discriminatory intent 
on the part of the principal perpetrator, and that with that knowledge the accused made a substantial 
contribution to the commission of that crime by the principal perpetrator.313  
  
This reasoning is flawed.  It uses aiding and abetting, which is a less direct means of holding an 
accused responsible, and thus carrying a lesser sentence, to justify a "lower" mens rea for 
specific intent crimes that go beyond an agreed-upon JCE.  As seen from the quote above, aiding 
and abetting requires a "substantial contribution" before liability attaches, whereas no such 
requirement is present in the direct forms of commission, including participation in a JCE (which 
is considered a form of "commission").  Aiding and abetting may have a "lower" mens rea but 
the "substantial contribution" requirement serves as a threshold for attributing responsibility.  
 The judgments in Krstic contribute further confusion.  The Trial Chamber convicted 
Krstic on grounds of JCE liability, holding that genocide was a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of a JCE to ethnically cleanse Srebrenica.  The Appeals Chamber overruled Krstic's 
guilt of genocide (and persecution314) on the basis of being a co-participant in a JCE, stating that:  
all that the evidence can establish is that Krstic was aware of the intent to commit genocide on the part of 
some members of the VRS Main Staff, and with that knowledge, he did nothing to prevent the use of Drina 
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Corps personnel and resources to facilitate those killings.  This knowledge on his part alone cannot support 
an inference of genocidal intent.315   
 
Thus, according to the Appeals Chamber in Krstic, awareness of others' intention to commit 
genocide may not be used as a substitute for the requirement that the perpetrator must possess 
genocidal intent.  The Appeals Chamber continued: "[g]enocide is one of the worst crimes 
known to humankind, and its gravity is reflected in the stringent requirement of specific intent.  
Convictions for genocide can be entered only where that intent has been unequivocally 
established."316  There must be actual proof that the perpetrator himself possessed the genocidal 
intent.  Although the Appeals Chamber found Krstic not liable as a co-perpetrator for genocide 
and persecution, it did find him guilty as an aider and abettor of those crimes.317    
 The Tribunal has contradicted itself on the issue of JCE liability for genocide.  The 
Tribunal shouts loudly about the gross nature of genocide and has even reserved findings of guilt 
for only those most responsible, yet it has also allowed third-category JCE liability for genocide.  
This practice is dangerous, not only for purposes of clarity, but also for allowing this means of 
attributing responsibility for the worst crime on the planet.  Attributing mass responsibility only 
results in a watering down of the crime itself, as a theory and in practice, and also lessens the 
direct perpetrators' liability by spreading liability amongst those not actually responsible.    
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B. The Relationship Between Joint Criminal Enterprise and Persecution 
Imagine a small squad of government soldiers that decides to imprison the population of 
a small village due to recent insurgent activity in the area.  The soldiers then destroy all the 
dwellings as a warning to other villages that may harbor or provide assistance to insurgents.  If 
the common plan of the soldiers was criminal, which the imprisonment of civilians and the 
indiscriminate destruction of property certainly are, it can be said that they were all part of a 
JCE.  Through first-category JCE liability, all of the soldiers would be responsible for all of the 
other soldiers' acts of imprisonment and destruction.  Each participant intended the same result: 
the imprisonment of the local civilian population and the destruction of civilian property.  Should 
one of the soldiers commit a crime that was outside the original criminal plan (imprisonment and 
property destruction), his fellow soldiers would nonetheless be responsible if the commission of 
that crime was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the original criminal plan.  For example, 
soldier A shoots and kills a civilian during the forced expulsion and imprisonment.  The other 
soldiers, say, B and C, would be responsible for the civilian's death because it is reasonably 
foreseeable that one of the soldiers would shoot a civilian due to the tense nature of removing 
villagers from their homes and shuttling them into detention camps.  As discussed above, this is 
classic third-category JCE liability.   
But what if the common criminal plan consisted of a general intent crime and the 
supposed natural and foreseeable crime was a specific intent crime, such as persecution or 
genocide?  It may be foreseeable that A commits an act outside the scope of the common plan, 
but is it foreseeable that A will commit that act with a specific discriminatory intent?  Is it 
foreseeable that A will specifically target, and then rape or murder a victim because that person is 
of a different racial, religious, or political background?  Such an analytical process requires the 
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court to look into the mind of a criminal, determine what he was thinking at the moment of 
commission, and then decide whether his thinking was foreseeable to a non-perpetrating partner.   
 Given its staunch advocacy of the doctrine, the prosecution at the ICTY would likely 
argue that B and C are still responsible for A's discriminatory act.  Even if B and C attempted to 
stop A from committing some persecutory act, they would still be held responsible if that act was 
foreseeable.  B and C are thus liable for what goes on in A's head, not merely for what acts he 
commits.  Analytically, it is much easier to attach liability to another's acts if those acts are based 
wholly on physical perpetration; only one step is required.  On the other hand, attributing 
responsibility for one's thoughts first requires the attribution of the direct perpetrator's acts, and 
also requires the attribution of the direct perpetrator's thoughts.  The extra step required stretches 
the doctrine thin. 
 The Tribunal has considered the case of a biased indirect perpetrator and an unbiased 
direct perpetrator with respect to the crime of persecution.  In Stakic, the Trial Chamber held that 
an indirect perpetrator (but who was still considered a co-perpetrator for purposes of JCE 
liability) may be held liable for the direct perpetrator's persecutory acts if the accused possessed 
discriminatory intent in relation to the actual attack.  Whether the direct perpetrator acted with or 
without discriminatory intent is irrelevant because "the actor may be used as an innocent 
instrument or tool only."318  Requiring proof of discriminatory intent by both the indirect and 
direct perpetrators, especially in the context of many acts, "would lead to an unjustifiable 
protection of superiors and would run counter to the meaning, spirit and purpose of the 
Statute."319  In these instances the Trial Chamber held that "proof of a discriminatory attack 
against a civilian population is a sufficient basis to infer the discriminatory intent of an accused 
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for the acts carried out as part of the attack in which he participated as a (co-)perpetrator."320  
This tends to run counter to individual criminal responsibility.  
 What, then, if the direct perpetrator was biased and his co-perpetrator was unbiased, in 
that he did not agree to or intend for the persecutory act to be committed?  Again, holding the co-
perpetrator responsible for the direct perpetrator's thoughts—that is, the discriminatory basis for 
directing the crime toward a specific victim—is a dangerous precedent.  Persecution should be 
reserved for the most culpable individuals who harbor ill-will and hatred towards a group; the 
individuals who translate that hurtful animosity into action are the worst threats.  Society must 
denounce such activity as the worst of the worst, but it must be careful not to overcast the net of 
liability.  Doing so jeopardizes the principle of individual culpability.   
 
VI. Suggestions for Improvement 
The introduction of the JCE doctrine within the last decade and its subsequent increased 
use, especially over the past few years, has proved to be a valuable tool in the ICTY Prosecutor's 
arsenal.  Individuals have increasingly been charged through their participation in criminal 
enterprises rather than through other modes of participation.  In fact, JCE has supplanted 
command responsibility as the charge of choice, even in cases where a command structure is 
present.  The doctrine of JCE took several years to catch on, during which time the prosecution 
pursued command responsibility as the favored means to liability.  But soon thereafter the 
prosecution realized the powerful notion of a JCE and began indicting suspected criminals under 
both command responsibility and JCE liability.321  The prosecution has since flipped its favorite 
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16, 2001); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Second Amended Indictment for Croatia, Case No. IT-02-54-T (July 28, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Amended Indictment for Bosnia, Case No. IT-02-54-T (Apr. 21, 2004). 
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theories of liability, and now often seeks prosecution through participation in a JCE rather than 
through command responsibility.    
 In order to continue in a legitimate manner, the ICTY should seek to halt its expansion of 
the JCE doctrine, especially the third category.  Although stare decisis does not bind the 
Tribunal, the jurisprudence of the ICTY most likely prevents it from altering its present 
standpoint.  The birth of the International Criminal Court, however, presents a new opportunity 
to preclude certain aspects of this expansive doctrine from gaining a foothold again in 
international criminal law.  The doctrine itself is not altogether incompatible with international 
criminal law, or even with the domestic criminal law of the world's major legal systems, but it 
must be modified and clarified before supporting its application.  There are two ways in 
particular that would strengthen the doctrine.  
 
A. The Significant Contribution Requirement 
JCE liability would be strengthened and would gain legitimacy if it required one's 
participation to constitute a substantial contribution to the enterprise.  The jurisprudence of the 
ICTY currently acknowledges that the second category of JCE does require a substantial 
contribution to the criminal enterprise.  The first and third categories, however, have no such 
restriction.  This absence poses a serious problem to the issue of causation.  Suppose a 13-year 
old aspiring insurgent, A, wishes to topple his current regime.  Throughout his young life he has 
experienced oppression at the hands of his autocratic ruler.  In the past few years a budding 
insurgency has grown into a formidable opposition and it has piqued his interest.  The opposition 
is underground, making joining somewhat difficult.  Not to be undeterred, A goes to the local 
café known for radicalism and, through a series of introductions, meets an individual with scant 
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information on joining the insurgency.  A then follows the instructions and meets D, a local 
leader responsible for a small neighborhood.  D has approximately ten fighters under his 
command.  After testing A's dedication to the cause and willingness to fight, D orders A to 
monitor police movements from a rooftop and report back to D everyday.  The question, then, is 
at what point has A become liable for the acts of the insurgency?  Is it when he actively searches 
to join the movement?  Is it when he has met with D and begun his initiation?  Is it when he first 
takes an order from D, or when he first steps onto the rooftop for his first assignment?  And what 
specific acts is he then responsible for?  Is he responsible only for the criminal acts resulting 
from his rooftop information, or for all the acts of D's cohorts?  What about the insurgency as a 
whole: Is A responsible for acts committed several hundred miles away, if those acts are 
undertaken with the purpose of overthrowing the current regime? 
 Testing the expansive nature of JCE liability highlights problems with its current 
structure.  Theoretically, the doctrine could attribute liability to A not only for the acts of D and 
his associates but also for the acts of all insurgents fighting for the same cause.  Few proponents 
of the doctrine have expanded the doctrine to such an extent; however, the lack of current limits 
does not preclude such expansion.  Thus, there are two related factors involved in this scenario: 
the time at which liability attaches, and the specific acts involved at the moment liability 
attaches.322
 Requiring a significant contribution to the enterprise would leave A free from liability 
until at least the point when he took up position on the rooftop.  Before then he had not provided 
any assistance to the enterprise.  The analysis would then require whether monitoring police 
                                                 
322 The nature of the acts when liability first attaches may change over time as the individual becomes more involved 
in the enterprise.  That is, if A only knows about a certain operation and only wishes to engage in that operation, A 
will only be responsible for that operation.  But if A continues to participate in the movement and learns of other 
operations, A will be responsible for those as well if those are part of the overall enterprise.   
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movements from a rooftop constituted a "significant contribution" to the enterprise, which in turn 
requires the defining of the JCE.  At the outset of the hypothetical, the JCE was characterized as 
being the overthrowing of the regime.  Working with this alleged purpose, standing atop a 
rooftop may be considered too tenuously connected to activities taking place several hundred 
miles away, even if those activities are undertaken with the goal of overthrowing the regime.  
But the rooftop lookout is closely related to the acts of D and his cronies, and therefore, when the 
criminal enterprise is narrowly defined, those same acts may be considered "significant" rather 
than when the criminal enterprise is broadly defined.  The significance of the acts should be 
directly related to the breadth of the purpose of the alleged JCE.  In other words, monitoring the 
rooftop is a significant contribution when the purpose of the JCE was the overtaking of 
Neighborhood X, but the same act is not a significant contribution when the purpose was the 
overthrowing of the central government.   
 
B. The Disallowance of Third-Category Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for 
Specific Intent Crimes 
 
Another modification to JCE liability that would strengthen the doctrine's legitimacy 
would be to preclude the application of third-category JCE liability to specific intent crimes.  In 
the U.S., whenever someone commits a heinous crime against another individual based simply 
on discrimination, whether race, nationality, religion, or sexual orientation, the community, 
rightfully so, condemns such acts as contrary to humanity.  Proponents of bias crimes statutes 
take to the streets advocating for tougher laws, and legislators debate the merits of such 
legislation.  Few would disagree that violent acts perpetrated against another solely due that 
person's distinguishing characteristics are morally reprehensible.  This is not the issue.  The issue 
is the legislating against thought.  The law prohibits certain acts: you may not commit assault 
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and battery, you may not kill, you may not rape.  The law does not, however, prohibit certain 
thoughts; to do so would be tantamount to an Orwellian legal system.  As a result, a neo-Nazi 
passing by an African-American along the street may wish bad things to the unknowing passerby 
simply because of the man's skin color; in fact, the neo-Nazi may even wish to perpetrate that 
evil himself.  But absent an overt act, the neo-Nazi has committed no crime—this is a fundament 
of criminal law.  The U.S.' strict adherence to freedom of speech has provided outlets to such 
thoughts, unlike countries such as Germany, which have dramatically different historical reasons 
for prohibiting certain hateful speech. 
What, then, might occur if a white man, with no racist tendencies, became involved with 
a small group of neo-Nazis, which then conspires to rob a liquor store?  The group enters the 
liquor store, and after muttering racist remarks, one of the neo-Nazis abruptly shoots the African-
American store clerk.  The confused others quickly pack up the cash and leave the store.  Who is 
liable, and for what? 
Under U.S. law, it would be reasonably foreseeable that an armed group entering a store 
would shoot and kill a store clerk, and thus, all those participating would probably be responsible 
for the killing even if that was not within the original purpose of the plan to rob.  If killing the 
store clerk was planned, then all would certainly be responsible, including the non-racist, 
regardless of who actually pulled the trigger.  In this case, they all intended to kill the clerk.  The 
crime of murder, therefore, is not a problem for attributing liability.  What about the crime of 
murder with a discriminatory purpose?  Such a crime is what is proscribed in the ICTY Statute, 
under the rubric of persecution as a crime against humanity.  Would the non-racist also be 
responsible for the heightened crime of murder with a discriminatory purpose, that is, the crime 
of persecution within the language of international criminal law?   
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The jurisprudence of the ICTY currently leans towards allowing this attribution.  The 
problem with such attribution is the transferring of thought from one individual to another.  Not 
only is the act (i.e., the pulling of the trigger) transferred, but the thoughts in the killer's head are 
also transferred.  Depending on what the killer was thinking at the moment of commission, a 
separate individual may be liable for both murder and for persecution.  If the killer's mind is 
clear, then the other non-direct perpetrator will be charged with murder.  If the killer's mind 
possessed discriminatory thoughts, the other individual is liable for persecution as well.  Specific 
intent crimes such as persecution overstretch the third category of JCE liability to its breaking 
point.  Attributing responsibility to an individual based on another individual's thoughts is 
contrary to the fundamentals of individual criminal responsibility.  The third category of JCE 
liability, therefore, should not be used as a vehicle for attributing liability for specific intent 
crimes. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The crime of persecution in international criminal law is rightfully criminalized.  Few 
other crimes generate such popular condemnation.  In fact, unlike the debate in the U.S. over the 
merits of bias crimes legislation, there is hardly anyone that criticizes the criminalization of 
persecution.  What makes persecution so particularly abhorrent is that it strikes at the diversity 
inherent in mankind.  Murder, rape, and torture are all odious crimes, but committing them 
simply because the individual is Muslim, Christian, Hutu, Tutsi, Shia or Sunni, heightens the 
level of brutality.  The classification of persecution as a distinct crime has widespread 
acceptance, but international criminal tribunals should not be quick to open the floodgates of 
liability.  The ICTY is in danger of doing just that.   
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JCE liability is a new animal in international criminal law.  It does have its roots in other 
doctrines of the past, thus adding to its credibility, but it is far from a one-hundred percent sound 
and warranted legal principle.  Hopefully, the International Criminal Court will work out some of 
the inconsistencies of the doctrine and clarify other points.  The third category of JCE liability 
especially suffers from flaws, most notably, the application of this extended form of liability to 
specific intent crimes.  Relying on this doctrine does facilitate convictions for serious crimes 
such as persecution and genocide, but they also "result in discounted convictions that inevitably 
diminish the didactic significance of the Tribunal's judgments and that compromise its historical 
legacy."323  An oft-cited purpose of international criminal tribunals is the reconciliation they 
promote.  As the opening quote to this article states, "promoting reconciliation and restoring true 
peace" must be at the forefront of every judgment and every judicial institution.  If justice is not 
seen to be done by those watching their friends, family, and national heroes on trial, then 
resentment will ensue and credibility for the legal process will wane.  Extending liability to 
another based on the thoughts of the direct perpetrator does not resonate with many peoples' 
notions of individual responsibility.  Without the people's acceptance of their leaders' and 
brethren's convictions, the future of a post-conflict society remains unstable.  Hero-worship of 
adjudicated criminals does nothing to help the stabilization and reconstruction of fragile 
societies.  The ICTY itself, perhaps the institution most capable and responsible for maintaining 
the balance between personal liability and justice, said it best:  
The expansion of mens rea is an easy but dangerous approach.  …  Stretching notions of individual mens 
rea too thin may lead to the imposition of criminal liability on individuals for what is actually guilt by 
association, a result that is at odds with the driving principles behind the creation of this International 
Tribunal.324
 
                                                 
323 Schabas, supra note 20, at 1034. 
324 Kordic and Cerkez, Trial Judgment, ¶ 219 (reference omitted).  
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It is hoped that the ICTY heeds its own wise call and reins in the unwarranted expansion of 
culpability. 
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